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THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY WITH
ANNOTATIONS TO THE INDIANA DECISIONS*
Section 57. LIMITATION OF AUTHORITY TO IDENTIFIED SUBJECT
MATTER.
(1) Authority to buy or to sell is linited to authority to
deal with a subject matter which is sufficiently described to
be identified with reasonable certainty by the agent in the
light of facts of which he has notice, or which the principal
intended to describe.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to buy or sell a
particular thing includes authority to buy or sell that which is
appurtenant to it.
Comment on Subsection (1):
a. The degree of particularity with which the subject mat-
ter must be described depends upon its nature. If the author-
ity has reference to specific things, the description must be so
definite that, with the knowledge which the agent has, he
should have no substantial doubt as to the subject matter,
except that if the description is ambiguous and the agent
acts in accordance with the principal's intent, the agent is
authorized so to act. In the absence of statute, it is not
necessary that the authorization be as definite as is required
in a conveyance of the subject matter. Extrinsic facts not
appearing in the principal's instructions may cause the de-
scription to be definite or ambiguous. If the description is
free from substantial doubt in the light of facts of which the
agent has notice, the agent is authorized to act upon it, al-
though he thereby mistakes the subject matter intended by
the principal. If the subject matter is specified only by a
general description, it may be inferred that the agent may
use his discretion in making a selection.
*Continued from November, 1935, issue and to be continued in subsequent issues.
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b. If the description is in terms of ownership, as where the
directions are to "sell all my land" or "all my cattle," it is
ordinarily inferred that the authorization is only to sell that
which is owned at the time of the authorization with the ac-
cretions at time of sale, such as matured crops or subsequent-
ly born calves. However, if 'the principal is a dealer in land
or cattle, the authorization may be interpreted as including
that acquired in the future. It is inferred that such a de-
scription would include the land or cattle of the principal
anywhere, unless the authority is given in connection with a
business, or other facts indicate a more limited meaning,
as where there have been previous negotiations concerning
the sale of all the principal's property in a particular locality,
or where the agent does business only in a particular locality.
An authorization to sell given by an individual presumptively
does not include authorization to sell property owned by him
in common with others; conversely it is inferred that an
authorization to sell given by co-owners jointly includes only
the sale of land of which they are co-owners. In both cases,
however, the attendant circumstances may rebut the infer-
ence, as where one owning no coal land except as a tenant
in common authorizes the sale of "all my coal land," or
where co-owners of a single lot, who also severally own other
lots, authorize the sale of "all our lots," as a preliminary to
moving away.
Comment on Subsection (2):
c. Whether or not an agent is authorized to sell or to
purchase a thing other than that specifically described may
depend upon whether the other thing is physically connected
with the thing described, or was specially made for use with
it, or is commonly regarded as a part of the other or the two
are commonly used or sold as a unit, and upon other similar
factors. An agent authorized to purchase or sell land would
be authorized to include the easements which are appurte-
nant as well as such things connected with the structures
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upon the land as, by custom, are regarded in the locality as
part of them, such as removable shutters, or in some locali-
ties, kitchen stoves. Authority to sell a second-hand auto-
mobile ordinarily includes authority to sell the tools which
happen to be in it at the time; an agent to purchase a yacht
would have authority 'to include in the purchase the boats
in the davits, or those commonly used by its owner to reach
the land.
On the other hand, it is inferred that a direction to buy
or to sell a number of things which are commonly regarded
as a unit includes authority only to deal with them as a unit,
and not to buy or sell them separately or a portion of them.
Thus, authority to sell a pair of matched horses does not in-
clude authority to sell one of them, at least unless the price
received for the one is as great as that authorized for both;
an agent authorized to purchase a designated menagerie
would not be authorized to buy all but the elephants.
Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.
Section 58. AUTHORITY TO MAKE UNSPECIFIED TERMs.
Unless otherwise agreed, the specification of particular
terms in an authorization to buy or to sell does not exclude
authority to make additional terms not inconsistent with those
prescribed, nor terms which diminish the duties or increase the
rights of the principal beyond those specified.
Comment:
a. Except where the principal prepares and furnishes to
the agent a form to be adopted in the making of contracts,
specific directions to the agentt are usually not intended to
be a complete statement of his authority and he is author-
ized to offer or accede to terms which are not unusual, nor
disadvantageous to his principal, nor contrary to the orders
or purposes of the principal of which the agent has notice.
Likewise, if an agent finds that he can accomplish his prin-
cipal's purpose on terms or conditions more favorable than
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-those named, ordinarily he has both authority and a duty
to do so. The principal, however, may have manifested his
desire to maintain uniform terms or conditions and not to
have them varied even for more favorable ones.
Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana.
The provision in a seller's printed order form that no representations or
guaranties have been made by the salesman on behalf of the seller which are not
expressed therein warrants an inference that the salesman is authorized to make
changes in the contract or make representations of a kind not expressed therein.
King v. Edward Thompson Co., 56 Ind. App. 274, 104 N. E. 106 (1914).
Section 59. DURATION OF AUTHORITY TO Buy OR SELL.
Authority to buy or to sell exists only when, from the mani-
festations of the principal or from the happening of events of
which the agent has notice, the agent reasonably believes that
the principal desires him to buy or to sell.
Comment:
a. Beginning. If the agent is directed to buy or to sell
only after a lapse of time or upon the happening of an event,
he is authorized to buy or to sell only after such time or after
the event happens, or perhaps (see § 45) after he reasonably
believes the event has happened. It would, however, ordi-
narily be inferred that the agent would be authorized to
make reasonably necessary preparations before this.
b. Termination. The authority of an agent to buy or to
sell may terminate by lapse of time, by the fact that the
agent or another has bought or sold the subject matter for
the principal, by the happening of conditions specifically
stated in the authorization, or by the occurrence of other
events from which the agent should infer that the principal
no longer desires him to buy or to sell, or would not desire
him to do so if he knew the facts. In some cases, the author-
ity of the agent terminates only when the agent has knowl-
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edge of such events; in other cases, the authority may ter-
minate before this. See §§ 105-116 for statements concern-
ing the inferences to be drawn in specific situations. Author-
ity may also be terminated irrespective of the original man-
ifestation by the principal, as where it is terminated by re-
vocation or renunciation, or by the death or loss of capacity
of one of the parties, or by impossibility (see §§ 117-124).
c. Apparent authority. If the authority terminates other-
wise than by the death or loss of capacity of one of the
parties or by impossibility, there may remain apparent au-
thority which subjects the principal to liability (see §§ 125-
132).
Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana.
An agent employed to drive live stock from one place to another has no
power, by virtue of such employment, to sell the stock, if some or all of it be-
comes foot-sore and unable to travel; and in case of a sale under such circum-
stances, the owner may recover his property from the purchaser. Reitz v. Martin,
12 Ind. 306, 74 Am. Dec. 215 (1859).
An agent merely for the storage and shipment of goods has no authority to
sell them. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Moline Plow Co., 13 Ind. App.
225, 41 N. E. 480 (1895).
Where one having custody of goods for sale has no authority to sell except
at a certain price, the fact that another claimed to act as his subagent in making
a sale does not defeat the claims of the principal to recover the goods from the
buyer. Lucas v. Rader, 29 Ind. App. 287, 64 N. E. 488 (1902).
Power to sell at retail does not authorize a sale at wholesale. Cathcart v.
Dalton, 71 Ind. App. 650, 125 N. E. 519 (1919).
Section 60. AUTHORIZED METHODS OF BUYING OR SELLING.
Unless otherwise agreed, authority to sell includes only au-
thority to sell at private sale and not at auction; authority to
purchase includes authority to purchase at private sale or
auction.
Comment:
a. Except where the subject matter sold is put into the
hands of an auctioneer, it is ordinarily inferred that the sale
of either land or chattels is to be made by private negotia-
tion, and not at auction even though an upset price is fixed.
In some markets, however, it is customary to auction certain
commodities and an agent authorized to sell would be au-
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thorized to act in accordance with the usage; in such case,
the agent, if not himself an auctioneer, is authorized to em-
ploy one. It is inferred that -agents to purchase are authorized
to exercise discretion as to whether it is better to purchase
at auction or at private sale.
Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.
Section 61. AMOuNT OF PICE TO BX PAID OR RECEID.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to buy or sell with
no price specified in terms includes authority to buy or sell
at the market price if any; otherwise at a reasonable price.
(2) Unless the agent has notice that the principal has a
fixed-price policy or unless other facts indicate that the prin-
cipal's directions are to be followed implicitly, an agent author-
ized to buy or sell at a fixed price or at the market price is
authorized to buy or sell at a price more advantageous to the
principal.
Comment:
a. The rules stated in this Section apply only to the 'in-
terpretation of the agent's authority. Except where there is
a definite market price, one known to be the.buying or sell-
ing agent for the principal or entrusted with the principal's
goods for sale ordinarily has apparent authority to bind the
principal by a contract at any reasonable price, unless the
third person has notice of the specified price. If there is a
definite market price, there is apparent authority, in such
cases, to buy or sell only at that price or at one more ad-
vantageous to the principal (see Comment on § 49).
Comment on Subsection (1):
b. Whether or not there is a market price and, if not, what
is a reasonable price, are questions of fact to be determined
in view of all the circumstances. Ordinarily, land has no def-
inite market price; the range within which a price is con-
sidered reasonable is wide. On the other hand, the price
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range for chattels frequently sold, even in the absence of a
definite market price, is ordinarily narrow, as is also the
range of discounts for conservative trade acceptances and
similar paper. For listed securities and graded commodities,
in cities in which there is an exchange, the current price on
the exchange is the market price. Whether or not the agent
is authorized to use discretion in awaiting a more favorable
market depends upon the imperativeness of his instructions,
as does also his authority to reconsign the goods to a differ-
ent market where the price is better.
c. If the agent is entitled to deduct his commission from
the amount to be paid by or to the principal, he is ordinarily
authorized to purchase for an amount more than that di-
rected or to sell for an amount less, if he makes a correspond-
ing deduction from his commission; except where the prin-
cipal has a fixed price policy, the principal is interested only
int the net amount paid or received.
Comment on Subsection (2):
d. Ordinarily, where the price is fixed by the buyer, he in-
tends it as the maximum price to be paid by the agent; ex-
cept in sales at retail by business organizations, the price
named by the seller is usually intended as the minimum
price. In both cases, the agent is usually expected to use dis-
cretion in obtaining better terms and if so it would be a
breach of duty to his principal for him to pay more or to
sell for less than that which he should know is acceptable to
the third person. There may be, however, reasons of policy
which require only the specified price to be paid or received.
Thus, manufacturers, interested in maintaining stable prices,
may fix prices which their agents are to pay in buying
through regular trade channels. Stores habitually set prices
at which their commodities are sold to the public at retail.
In all such cases, if the agent has notice of the business pol-
icy of the principal he is authorized to sell only at the speci-
fied price.
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Annotation:
Subsection 1. No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject
matter of this subsection.
Subsection 2. The rule stated in this subsection is in accord with the law of
Indiana. Lucas v. Rader, 29 Ind. App. 287, 64 N. E. 488 (1902).
Section 62. AUTHORITY TO PAY OR RECEIVE PuRcHAsE PRICE.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to contract for a
purchase or sale or to make or receive a conveyance on terms
by which part or all of the price is payable at the time when
the contract or conveyance is made includes authority to pay
or to receive so much of the price as is payable at such time.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to purchase chat-
tels or choses in action includes authority to pay for them if,
but only if, the agent is authorized to receive possession of
them or of the documents representing them; authority to sell
chattels or choses in action does not include authority to re-
ceive the purchase price unless the agent has been entrusted
with them or with the documents representing them.
Comment on Subsection (1):
a. If an agent is authorized to contract for a transfer or
to make or to receive a transfer upon specified terms, it is
ordinarily inferred that he is authorized to receive or to pay
the price which the terms specify is to be paid at the time
when he acts. Thus, an agent to contract for the sale of land,
authorized to require a payment at the time of completion
of the contract, is authorized to receive for the principal a
payment then made. Likewise, a purchasing agent, supplied
with his principal's funds, is prima facie authorized to use
them for a payment at the time when the contract is made
or, if not supplied with funds, to advance his own money,
if he is also authorized to contract for such advance pay-
ment. Ordinarily, a selling agent is authorized to sell only
for money to be paid when title is transferred, and a pur-
chasing agent is ordinarily authorized to pay only on trans-
fer of title (see § 65).
Authority to make or receive payment at the time of con-
tract or of the transfer does not include authority to make
or receive payments due at a later time.
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Comment on Subsection (2):
b. The words "documents representing" a chattel or chose
in action mean documents such as bills of lading, negotiable
paper, and share certificates which, by law or custom, so far
represent the interests of the owner of the things to which
they refer that his interests therein are transferred by a
transfer of the documents. The entrusting to the agent of
such an instrument in a form such that it may be negotiated
by him is equivalent to an entrusting of the thing itself for
the purposes of the rule stated in this Section.
An agent to purchase movables, not authorized to receive
possession of them, ordinarily is authorized only to purchase
on credit, or for a price to be paid when title is subsequently
transferred. A selling agent, not entrusted with the posses-
sion of movables or of the documents representing them,
ordinarily has no authority to do more than conclude a con-
tract of sale and has not authority to receive payment. There
may, however, be a usage, in certain types of transactions,
to make payment when the contract is made and before the
transfer of title, as where articles are to be manufactured
or shipped to the purchaser's order; in such cases the amount
to be paid in advance is usually specifically stated in the
authorization to the agent.
Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana. Ulrich
v. McCormick, 66 Ind. 243 (1879); Hachleman v. Moat, 4 Blackf. 164 (1836).
Section 63. AUTHORITY TO WARRANT OR REPRESENT.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to sell includes au-
thority to make such promises operating as warranties, and
only such, as are usual in such a transaction; authority to buy
is limited to purchases accompanied by such warranties.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to sell includes au-
thority to make such, and only such, representations as the
agent reasonably believes to be true and as are usual with
reference to such a subject matter or, in the absence of usage,
representations concerning qualities of the subject matter
which, at the time, are not open to inspection and as to which
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the principal has reason to know the buyer will desire to be
informed; authority to buy on credit includes authority to
make such representations concerning the credit of the buyer
as the buyer has reason to know will be required by the seller.
Comment:
a. A party to a contract of sale or a conveyance may in-
clude in his promises a warranty as to the present or future
existence of a fact. Such promises may be made irrespective
of any representation of fact. It is only as to warranties of
this sort that the rule stated in Subsection (1) is applicable.
In the sale of chattels, ordinarily a misrepresentation as to
a material fact concerning the subject matter has the con-
sequences of a breach of warranty as well as those of a mis-
representation. Statements of the agent interpreted as rep-
resentations, whether or not having the effect of a warranty,
are within the rule stated in Subsection (2).
b. Unless the circumstances or the terms of his authoriza-
tion indicate otherwise, an agent has no authority to war-
rant what he has reason to believe the principal cannot per-
form, nor to make statements which he does not reasonably
believe to be true. The principal may, however, be subject
to liability to third persons to whom the agent makes such
promises or representations.
Comment on Subsection (1):
c. In the absence of a usage or other indication of the
principal's consent to do so, an agent authorized to sell either
land or goods is not authorized to make promises as to the
present or future existence of a fact in connection with the
sale. If there is a usage, however, to give a warranty upon
the sale of a particular subject matter, authority to give
such a warranty is ordinarily inferred from authority to sell,
if the agent has no notice that the warranty cannot be per-
formed. On the other hand, no authority is inferred in a
purchasing agent to purchase without a customary warranty.
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It is not within the scope of the Restatement of this Subject
to state what warranties are inferred in a sale, if not ex-
pressed.
Comment on Subsection (2):
d. SeUing agents. Unless there is an indication that the
principal does not desire him to do so, an agent authorized
to sell is thereby authorized to give such description, rea-
sonably believed by him to be true, of the things sold as is
usual in transactions of that nature. If the sale is by de-
scription, as in the case of distant land or goods not in the
agent's possession, he is authorized to give an adequate de-
scription, either from the description furnished him by the
principal, or from his own knowledge. Such description in-
cludes: as to land, the character of its soil, woods, minerals,
and contour, its location, boundaries and area; as to goods,
the color, size, strength and other similar qualities. In the
sale of corporate shares or securities by individual solicita-
tion, the authorized representation would ordinarily include
statements as to the business of the corporation, its profits,
assets and general financial condition, and its affiliations and
officers.
As to land or goods present at the time of sale, the agent
is authorized to make such statements concerning qualities
not open to the buyer's observation or simple test, as the
principal has reason to know will be likely to be made in
urging the sale, or in answering inquiries of the buyer. In
determining what statements the principal has reason to
know are likely to be made, the position of the agent in the
business organization of the principal and the class of per-
sons to whom the principal has reason to believe the agent
will sell are considered. A sales manager ordinarily has wider
discretion as to statements than a special agent; the prin-
cipal has reason to believe that professional buyers pur-
chasing large quantities will make their own tests, but that
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persons not in business purchasing small quantities will
largely seek information from and rely upon the statements
of the agent.
e. Buying agents. Whether or not an agent authorized
to purchase on credit is thereby authorized to make state-
ments concerning the credit of the buyer depends largely up-
on the size of the transaction, the previous relations between
the buyer and seller, the ability of the seller to secure
through ordinary trade channels information concerning the
buyer, the position of the agent in the buyer's business or-
ganization, and similar factors.
f. Liability of the principal. Although the principal has
directed the agent not to make representations which other-
wise would be authorized under the rule stated in this Sec-
tion, a known agent has apparent authority to make them
to persons having no notice of the limitations upon his au-
thority (see § 49). Likewise, the principal is subject to
liability for statements made by the agent which, if true,
would be within his authority or apparent authority. Fur-
thermore, the principal is subject to an action of deceit or
to a bill for rescission if the agent makes statements which
induce the transaction and which concern a matter which
the principal has reason to know is likely to be the subject
of representations. This liability of the principal is not nec-
essarily based upon apparent authority in the agent; it is
based upon a policy of requiring the principal to compen-
sate third persons who have dealt with his agents for loss
caused by the agents' wrongful conduct. See §§ 161, 162,
165, 256-264.
If the third person has notice of the limitations upon the
agent's authority, as where there is a clause in the contract
specifying the limits, the agent has no apparent authority
or other power to subject the principal to liability for state-
ments not within such limits because of their untruth, but
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the. transaction may be rescinded by the other party before
the principal has materially changed his position (see § 259).
Annotation:
Subsection 1. An agent upon whom general authority to sell is conferred will
be presumed to have general authority to warrant, unless the contrary appears.
Talmage v. Bierhause, 103 Ind. 270, 2 N. E. 716 (1885).
Subsection 2. It will be presumed, in the absence of a showing to the con-
trary, that a warranty is not an unusual incident to a sale by an agent for a
dealer, where the thing sold is not present and subject to inspection by the pur-
chaser. Talmage v. Bierhause, 103 Ind. 270, 2 N. E. 716 (1885).
See, also: Brier v. Mankey, 47 Ind. App. 7, 93 N. E. 672 (1911); Richmond
Trading & Mfg. Co. v. Farquar, 8 Blackf. 89 (1846); Court v. Snyder, 2 Ind.
App. 440, 28 N. E. 718 (1891).
Section 64. EMPLOYMNT OF ASSISTANTS.
Unless otherwise agreed, it is inferred that authority to
buy or to sell includes authority to secure such professional
or other assistants as the proper performance of the transac-
tion requires.
Comment:
a. The authority to employ an assistant may be inferred
because it is usual to do so in transacting business of the
kind; because the principal has notice that the agent does
not have a license or other requirement for performing the
authorized act; because the transactions are so numerous
that the principal has reason to expect that the agent would
need to employ some one to assist him; or because of a
change of conditions which makes such an employment
desirable. If the agent is authorized to substitute another
agent for himself, the principal is responsible for the com-
pensation of such person, and the agent is not resppnsible to
the principal for the conduct of such a person carefully se-
lected; if he is authorized to employ another as his own
agent to assist him in the performance of work which he
undertakes for the principal, the agent is himself responsible
for such compensation, and to the principal and to third
persons for the conduct of such person (see §§ 77-81).
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Annotation:
For an analogous situation, see Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester, 180
Ind.- 357, 101 N. E. 915 (1913).
Section 65. GivING OR RECEIVING CASH OR CREDIT.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to sell includes only
authority to sell for money payable at the time of the transfer
of title.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to purchase in-
cludes:
(a) if the principal supplies the funds, authority to buy for
money only and not on credit; or
(b) if the principal does not supply the funds, authority to
pledge his credit upon usual or reasonable terms.
Comment on Subsection (1):
a. Unless otherwise agreed, authority to sell does not in-
clude authority to mortgage the subject matter, to exchange
it, to make a gift of it, to grant an option of purchase, or
to partition it. Likewise, the consideration receivable must
be money payable at the time of the transfer of the title and
payable to the principal or to an agent authorized to re-
ceive it.
b. Although the specific terms of the authorization do not
direct the receipt of anything other than money by the agent,
the previous course 'of conduct by the principal or the cus-
toms of the particular locality in reference to the sale of the
subject matter in question may indicate that the agent may
receive something else for it. Authority to contract for pay-
ment by certified check or bank draft payable to the prin-
cipal is frequently inferred. Likewise, a sale on credit is
frequently inferred from a previous course of dealing by the
principal or others engaged in like business. Although the
principal directs the agent to sell on credit, it would ordi-
narily be inferred that the agent is also authorized to sell
for cash. Comment b on § 72 states the rule as to the re-
ceipt of things other than money, where the contract pro-
vides for payment in money.
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Comment on Subsection (2):
c. If the principal supplies the agent with funds, ordi-
narily it is understood that the agent's authority is limited
to a cash purchase for an amount not exceeding that with
which he is supplied by the principal. If it is understood that
the funds supplied by the principal are but a first payment,
the rule stated in Clause (b) is applicable.
d. In particular businesses, there are usually understand-
ings in regard to credit including varying discounts for pay-
ments within specified periods. If no other terms are ex-
pressed, it is inferred that an agent not supplied with funds
is authorized to contract in accordance with, and only in
accordance with, the terms usual in the particular business,
except that he may accept terms not increasing the burdens
of the principal beyond those usually imposed in such cases.
e. If the principal directs specific terms to be made, ordi-
narily the agent is not authorized to vary these even though
he reasonably believes that other terms are more favorable
to the principal, except that he may accept terms giving the
principal an alternative to those directed, or otherwise di-
minishing the principal's burdens.
* * *
j. Authority to purchase upon the principal's credit does
not include authority to borrow money from a person other
than the seller in order to effect such purchase, or to give
negotiable paper in the principal's name as security for or in
payment of the price. As stated in §§ 74, 76, authority to
borrow money or to execute negotiable instruments on be-
half of the principal is not readily inferred.
Annotation:
Subsection 1. The rule stated in this subsection is in accord with the law of
Indiana.
In the absence of a custom to the contrary, it is the duty of the agent to
sell for cash only. Rich v. Johnston, 61 Ind. 246 (1878).
Similarly it is held that an agent who has authority to receive payment for
a debt can not bind his principal by an arrangement short of actual collection.
Kirk v. Hiatt, 2 Ind. 322 (1850).
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Subsection 2.
(a) No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
division of subsection 2.
(b) No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
division of subsection 2.
Section 66. AUTHORITY AFTER PURCHASE OR SALE.
Unless otherwise agreed, authority to buy or to sell does
not include authority to rescind or modify the terms of the
sale after its completion nor to act further with reference to
the subject matter except to undo fraud or to correct mistake.
Comment:
a. Comment c on § 51, which deals with the agent's au-
thority where there has been fraud or mistake, is applicable.
Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana.
If an agent has authority to sell or to negotiate sales and to collect the pur-
chase price, be has no authority to cancel the debt on surrender to him of the
property constituting a security for the debt without some access of authority.
Robinson & Co. v. Nipp, 20 Ind. App. 156, 50 N. B. 408 (1898); Sptingfield
Engine & Thresher Co. v. Kennedy, 7 Ind. App. 502, 34 N. E. 856 (1893).
TITLE C. AUTHORIZATION TO LEASE
Section 67. WHEN AUTHORITY TO LEASE Is INFERRED.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to lease land or
chattels is inferred from authority to manage the subject mat-
ter if leasing is the usual method of dealing with it or if, in
view of the principal's business and other circumstances, leas-
ing is a reasonable method of dealing with it.
(2) Authority to lease land or chattels is not inferred mere-
ly from an authority to sell the subject matter, to take charge
of it, or to receive rents from it.
Comment:
a. The authority to lease is the more readily inferred in
the case of land or chattels ordinarily devoted to leasing
purposes. Authority to manage a business upon land of the
principal's does not ordinarily justify an inference that the
agent may lease it or a portion of it.
b. Authority to make conditional sales includes author-
ity to make sales in the form of leases if that is a usual form.
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Annotation:
Subsection 1. No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject
matter of this subsection.
Subsection 2. The rule stated in this subsection is in accord with the law of
Indiana. The I. M. & C. Union v. The C., C., C. & I. R. W. Co., 45 Indt 281
(1873); Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Beales, 74 N. E. S51 (1905), reversed,
166 Ind. 684, 76 N. E. 520 (1906).
Section 68. AUTHORITY INFERIED FRom AUTHORiTY TO LEASE.
The rules of interpretation stated in §§ 52-66 as applicable
to authority to sell are applicable to authority to lease.
Comment:
a. A direction to an agent "to lease" may mean, particu-
larly if the agent is a broker, that the agent is to find a
lessee with whom the principal is to make the final negotia-
tions; or it may mean that the agent is to contract for a
lease or is to execute, a lease (see § 53).
b. Authority to find a lessee ordinarily includes authority
to state the terms upon which the principal is willing to
lease and authority to solicit offers (see § 54 and Comment
thereon, dealing with authority to find a purchaser). Au-
thority to contract for a lease ordinarily includes authority
to negotiate the contract, making therein the usual terms and
appropriate provisions to make the agreement effective and,
if a writing is required or is usual, to execute such a writing
in the usual form (see § 55). Unless otherwise agreed, au-
thority to execute a lease of property includes authority to
agree upon the usual terms of the lease, to make the usual
representations and warranties, to execute instruments re-
quired for or manifesting the lease, and to surrender posses-
sion if the agent has been entrusted therewith (see § 56).
Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana. Wood-
ward v. Lindley, 43 Ind. 333 (1873); The 1. M. & C. Union v. The C., C., C. &
I. R. W. Co., 4S Ind. 281 (1873); Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Beales, 74
N. E. 551 (1905), reversed, 166 Ind. 684, 76 N. E. 520 (1906).
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TITLE D. AUTHORIZATION TO TAKE CHARGE OF LAND,
CHATTELS, OR INVESTMENTS
Section 69. AurHoiTry oF AGENT IN CHARGE OF THINGS.
Unless otherwise agreed, authority to take charge of land,
chattels, or securities includes authority to take reasonable
measures appropriate to the subject matter, to protect the sub-
ject matter against destruction or loss, to keep it in reason-
able repair, to recover it if lost or stolen, and, if the subject
matter is ordinarily insured by owners, to insure it.
Comment:
a. If the subject matter is land, the agent ordinarily has
authority and a duty to protect it from the depredations of
third persons; if it is a structure, to make necessary repairs
to keep out wind and weather, but not ter make structural
changes; if it consists of chattels or securities, to protect
them from loss and theft by providing a reasonably safe
place of storage.
b. If the subject matter is lost or stolen, the agent is or-
dinarily authorized to take reasonable measures for its re-
covery if it is necessary to act at once. This may include the
institution of suit in the principal's name against a con-
verter. As in other cases where an unexpected event hap-
pens (see § 47), the agent is not authorized to incur any
substantial outlay if it is possible to communicate with the
principal and ascertain his wishes.
c. An agent authorized to take charge of land, chattels,
or securities has thereby no authority to sell, mortgage,
pledge, or otherwise transfer the subject matter; to apply
it to the payment of debts or other obligations of the prin-
cipal; or to apply it to his own debts or obligations.
Annotation:
An agent employed to drive live stock from one place to another has no
authority to sell the stock in case it becomes foot-sore. Reitz v. Martin, 12 Ind.
306, 74 Am. Dec. 215 (1859).
Section 70. AuTHORITY TO MAKE INVESTMNTS.
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent authorized to make or
manage investments is authorized to invest in, and only in,
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such securities as would be obtained by a prudent man for
his own account, having regard both to safety and income con-
sidering his means and purposes; and, if the agent's duties
include management, to change investments in accordance with
changes in the security of the investments, or the condition
of the principal sum.
Comment:
a. The Comment on § 425, which deals with the duty of
an agent to invest or manage investments, and which dis-
tinguishes between the duties of such an agent and of a
trustee who is not an agent, is applicable.
Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana. Rochester
v. Levering, 104 Ind. 562, 4 N. E. 203 (1886) (Where an attorney as agent had
control over and management of all of the principal's property and business.);
Bronnenburg v. Rinker, 2 Ind. App. 391, 28 N. E. 568 (1891) (Where a broker
loaned money on inadequate security, held, he must use such diligence as per-
sons -of common prudence are accustomed to use about their own business and
affairs.).
TITLE E. AUTHORIZATION TO RECEIVE PAYMENT
Section 71. WHEN AUTHORITY IS INFERRED.
Unless otherwise agreed, authority to receive payment is
inferred from authority to conduct a transaction if the receipt
of payment is incidental to such a transaction, usually accom-
panies it, or is a reasonably necessary means for accomplish-
ing it.
Comment:
a. Agents employed to sell have authority to receive pay-
ment under the conditions stated in § 62. Agents conduct-
ing a lending business also have authority to receive pay-
ment (see § 73 (e)). However, an agent has no authority
to receive payment merely from the fact that he represented
the principal in the transaction out of which the debt arose,
although such an agent is frequently authorized to receive
payment. Likewise, an agent who has been given possession
of securities or other evidences of debts payable to the prin-
cipal is not thereby authorized to receive payment. A bank
or other business organization does not have authority to
receive payment of a debt because payment is required to
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be made at its place of business. In all of these cases, if such
authority is present, it is because of the existence of prior re-
lations between the principal and agent or other circum-
stances indicating such authority.
b. Interest. Interest is incidental to a debt, and it is
inferred that an agent authorized to receive payment of the
principal sum is authorized to receive interest due thereon
when the debt is payable. On the other hand, authority to
receive the principal sum is not inferred from authority to
receive interest.
c. Apparent authority. The existence and extent of ap-
parent authority is determined in accordance with the rules
stated in Comments a and b (see § 49 and Comment f there-
on). Thus, an agent who makes an authorized loan does not
thereby have apparent authority to receive payment of the
debt. Nor does the possession of a security or other evidence
of debt payable to the principal of itself create apparent au-
thority to receive payment of the debt in the person so hav-
ing possession. However, a combination of these facts or of
one of these facts with other facts which have a tendency
to show authority may create apparent authority. Thus, if
an agent is authorized to lend money upon negotiable in-
struments and is permitted by the principal to retain an in-
strument given for a loan, there is ordinarily apparent au-
thority in the agent to receive either principal or interest
when due.
Annotation:
Where an agent sells and delivers personal property, he has authority to re-
ceive payment. Howe Machine Co. v. Simler, S9 Ind. 307 (1877).
An attorney who negotiates a loan has authority to accept payment. Wagner
v. McCool, 52 Ind. App. 124, 100 N. E. 395 (1913).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Section 72. AUTHORITY INPERRED FROM AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE
PAYMENT.
Unless otherwise agreed, authority to receive payment in-
cludes authority:
(a) to receive payment in full in money when the debt is
due; and
(b) to surrender to the payer any security for or evidence
of the debt to which he is entitled and to give him such
receipt as it is usual to give.
Comment on Clause (a):
a. Payment in full. Authority to collect does not include
authority to compromise, to release any part of the debt, or
to permit a deduction because of an alleged set-off or coun-
terclaim. Nor is a collecting agent authorized to accept a
part payment, even without extension of time or other
consideration, if the part payment, as the agent has notice,
would prejudice the collection of the residue, as where it
affects the choice of an appropriate remedy or the court in
which suit must be brought. The receipt of part payment,
however, is authorized if such receipt does not prejudice the
position of the principal, and in many situations it is also au-
thorized because of the circumstances under which the agent
is employed, as where an overdue claim against an impecuni-
ous debtor is given to a collection agency.
b. Payment in money. The money need not be legal
tender; it must, however, be that which currently passes at
par in the community as money. Unless there is a usage to
the contrary, checks, whether or not certified, or bank drafts
may be accepted only as conditional payment, and then only
without the surrender of a lien or the conveyance of a title.
Although the agent is authorized to accept only money, if he
accepts a draft payable to himself which is paid, the payment
is effective (see § 178). If the agent is authorized to ac-
cept only negotiable instruments, he is authorized to accept
only those payable to the principal and he has thereby no
authority to endorse them.
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A general agent, such as a manager or an agent employed
to collect a debt against a debtor of doubtful solvency, is
frequently authorized to accept things other than money in
payment. However, in the absence of special circumstances
or a specific authorization to do so, an agent to collect is
not authorized to accept in payment, at even the lowest valu-
ation, land, chattels, the note of a third person, or other se-
curities; nor, except where there is a commercial usage to do
so, as in the case of banks, is the agent authorized to sub-
stitute himself as a debtor.
c. When due. The inference that an agent to collect a
debt is not authorized to collect it before it is due is rein-
forced if its premature receipt cuts off the principal's right
to iiterest or imposes on him a, duty of immediate perfor-
mance, or if there are difficulties in transmitting the money
to the principal or in holding the money' for him, or if the
money is collected by a bank which becomes a debtor until
drawn upon by the principal. As in other cases, however,
the circumstances surrounding the authorization may indi-
cate that the principal desires the money as soon as he can
get it. Likewise, if it is doubtful when payment is due, the
agent ordinarily is authorized to accept it when it reasonably
may be thought tobe due.
d. Means of obtaining payment. Authority to receive
payment does not include authority to institute legal pro-
ceedings, either by attachment or otherwise, nor authority
to submit the claim to arbitration, nor authority to place it
in the hands of an attorney for collection; nor is the agent
authorized to endorse, in the name of the principal, the
debtor's note in order to enable him to obtain money for the
payment, nor to purchase goods from the debtor to secure
payment of the claim. If -the debt is due and the debtor re-
sides in a distant place, it is ordinarily inferred that the
agent has authority to appoint either another agent or a
subagent to collect the claim (see §§ 79-80). If he sends the
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claim to a distant place for collection, he does not, however,
aside from the statute or usage, have authority to send the
evidence of the claim to the debtor himself, as where a
bank in one city receives for collection a draft drawn or
accepted by a bank in another city; nor, except where there
is a usage to do so, as in the case of banks, does he have
authority to authorize the collecting agent to remit as pay-
ment a draft drawn upon another person.
The agent is not authorized to assign the claim to a third
person, even at its face value.
e. After payment. Whether or not authority to collect
a debt includes authority to remit the amount collected to
the principal depends upon the circumstances surrounding
the authorization, including the relations of the parties. If
authorized to remit, it is ordinarily inferred that the agent
is to remit within a reasonable time and by the means ordi-
narily used for the transmission of funds. Authority to re-
ceive a check in payment of a debt does not of itself include
authority to endorse the principal's name on the check, al-
though frequently an agent would be authorized to endorse
it for deposit to an already existing account of the principal;
if the agent is authorized to remit the amount in changed
form, as where he is to deduct his commission, he would
ordinarily be authorized to endorse the principal's name for
the purpose of obtaining the bank draft or other thing which
he is to remit to the principal. An agent is ordinarily au-
thorized to deposit money received in a bank, or other safe
depositary, but not in his own name, unless he is authorized
to become a debtor for the amount collected. One collecting
for a number of principals is normally authorized to mix their
funds in one bank deposit, if he indicates that the deposits
are made by him as a fiduciary. In many cases, by commer-
cial usage or agreement, the collecting agent is authorized
to make himself a debtor of the amount collected, as in the
case of factors or banks receiving drafts for collection.
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f. Liabilities to principal. Section 426 states the duties
and liabilities to the principal of agents authorized to collect.
Comment on Clause (b):
g. Surrender of securities and receipts. If the money is
payable only upon a conveyance, an agent authorized to re-
ceive payment is authorized to deliver an instrument mak-
ing the conveyance effective. If securities have been given
by the debtor he is entitled to their return. If the debt is
evidenced by a document, as in the case of a note or bond,
the debtor is entitled to it. If the securities consist of in-
struments endorsed to the principal, the agent is authorized
to endorse the principal's name in so far as that is re-
quired to transfer them, although he is not authorized to en-
dorse them in such a manner as to subject his principal to
liability upon them.
The agent is also authorized to make any release of record
which is required, as where a statute requires a mortgagee
upon payment of the mortgage to enter a release in the
office of the recorder. Likewise, it is ordinarily inferred that
the agent is authorized to execute a document evidencing
what he has received and the satisfaction of the claim of the
principal, although the principal may be under no duty to
give such a document.
Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana.
An agent is not authorized to bind his principal by any arrangement short
of an actual collection. Davis v. Talbot, 137 Ind. 235, 36 N. E. 1098 (1894);
McCormick v. Walter A. Wood M. & R. M. Co., 72 Ind. 518 (1880); O'Connor
v. Arnold, 53 Ind. 203 (1876).
An agent has no authority to accept his own note and the note of a third
person for the purchase price of real estate. Runyon v. Snell, 116 Ind. 164, 18
N. E. 522, 9 Am. St. Rep. 839 (188).
An agent ii not authorized to surrender the note of his principal and receive
in payment a note payable to himself. Robinson v. Anderson, 106 Ind. 152, 6
N. E. 12 (1886).
An attorney to whom a note is sent for collection has no authority to trans-
fer the property in it to a third person. Russell v. Drummond, 6 Ind. 216 (1855).
An agent to collect has no authority to receive notes of third persons by way
of compromise. Jones v. Ransom, 3 Ind. 327 (1852); Kirk v. HWt, 2 Ind. 322
(1850). For other similar holdings, see: Wakeman v. Jones, 1 Ind. 517 (184);
Corning v. Strong, 1 Ind. 329 (1849); Miller v. Edmoniton, 8 Blackf. 291 (1846).
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An attorney to collect a judgment has no authority to receive anything but
cash as payment; but where an attorney receives a check in line of his employ-
ment to collect a judgment, he has implied authority to indorse it. Brown v.
Grimes, 74 Ind. App. 655, 129 N. E. 483 (1921).
With respect to attorneys and clients, see: IND. ANN. STAT. (Baldwin, 1934)
§ 831; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1933) § 4-3609; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926)
§ 1039.
An agent to collect has no authority to receive checks in payment. Hamilton
Nat. Bank v. Nye, 37 Ind. App. 464, 77 N. E. 295, 117 Am. St. Rep. 333 (1906i).
An agent to collect has no authority to receive property in payment of a
note. Robinson & Co. v. Nipp, 20 Ind. App. 156, 50 -N. E. 408 (1898).
TITLE F. INTERPRETATION OF AUTHORIZATION TO
MANAGE A BUSINESS
Section 73. WHAT AUTHORITY IS INFEMRE.
Unless otherwise agreed, authority to manage a business
includes authority:
(a) to make contracts which are incidental to such busi-
ness, are usually made in it, or are reasonably neces-
sary in conducting it;
(b) to procure equipment and supplies and to make repairs
reasonably necessary for the proper conduct of the
business;
(c) to employ, supervise, or discharge employees as the
course of business may reasonably require;
(d) to sell or otherwise dispose of goods or other things
in accordance with the purposes for which the business
is operated;
(e) to receive payment of sums due the principal and to pay
debts due from the principal arising out of the business
enterprise; and
(f) to direct the ordinary operations of the business.
Comment:
a. Meaning of "manager." The words "manage" and
"manager" are not of precise legal import. It is consistent
with the idea of management that some one else shall deter-
mine plans and policies which the manager is to execute.
Thus, the general manager of a corporation may exercise
all of the operative functions of the corporation within the
field or under the rules prescribed by the board of directors.
A manager may be an officer of a corporation whose office
signifies general management, such as president, or one who
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in fact manages although holding a subordinate office. Ex-
cept for purposes of determining apparent authority, the
name of the office held is unimportant; the functions per-
formed with the consent of the principal are determinative.
A manager may be in charge of the entire business of the
principal or of a part of it. The size of the unit of which
the agent has charge is unimportant in defining the scope
of his discretion to act within such unit. On the other hand,
a person merely in charge of details or the physical conduct
of servants, such as an overseer or a foreman, is not a man-
ager within the meaning of this Section.
b. Acts not autkorized. Prima facie, authority to man-
age a business does not include authority to make unusual or
extraordinary contracts; to discontinue the business or any
department thereof; to sell, pledge, or otherwise dispose of
the business or any branch thereof, or the premises upon
which it is conducted; or radically to change the nature of
the business or to engage in a new business.
Prima facie, a manager has no power to borrow money
in connection with the operation of the business or to issue
negotiable instruments in the name of the principal, ex-
cept where the business conducted is one involving the bor-
rowing of money or the issuing of negotiable instruments,
such as banking and other financial businesses (see §§ 74-
76).
In all the above cases however, authority to act may be
inferred from the circumstances of the authorization or from
subsequent events, as where, in the absence of the principal,
an emergency arises which can be met only by exceeding
what is ordinarily the manager's authority.
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Annotation:
(a) Officials of banks have authority to bind the banks by acts ordinarily
connected with such business. The First Nat. Bank of Indidnapolis v. New, 146
Ind. 411, 45 N. E. 597 (1896); The Evansville Public Hall Co. v. The Bank of
Commerce, 144 Ind. 34, 42 N. E. 1097 (1896).
An agent has authority to do acts necessarily incident to the performance of
a duty required of him by the principal. Shackmap v. Little, 87 Ind. 181 (1882);
Cruzan v. Smith, 41 Ind. 288 (1872); Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399 (1866);
Tomlinson v. Collett, 3 Blackf. 436 (1834).
The management of a business, such as a creamery, authorizes an agent to
execute contracts in furtherance of the business. Warren Creamery Co. v. Farm-
ers' State Bank of Redkey, 81 Ind. App. 453, 143 N. E. 635 (1924).
A general agent has authority to bind his principal by transactions and repre-
sentations incident to the business in charge of the agent. Glazer v. Hooke, 74
Ind. App. 497, 129 N. E. 249 (1920).
A general manager has authority to bind his principal in a contract releasing
an injured employee's claim for damages. American Quarries Co. v. Lay, 37 Ind.
App. 386, 73 N. E. 608 (1905).
(b) The rule stated in this division of section 73 is in accord with the law
of Indiana. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Green, 164 Ind. 349, 73
N. E. 707 (1905).
(c) It is not within the scope of the authority of the general manager of an
ordinary manufacturing business to employ a physician to treat an injured em-
ployee except in case of absolute necessity. See Chaplin v. Freeland, 7 Ind. App.
676, 34 N. E. 1007 (1893).
(d) A power to sell at retail does not authorize the mortgaging of the prop-
erty or selling at wholesale. Kiefer v. Klinsick, 144 Ind. 46, 42 N. E. 477 (1895);
Cathcart v. Dalton, 71 Ind. App. 650, 125 N. E. 519 (1919).
Authority to buy and sell does not authorize the drawing or indorsing of bills
and notes. Smith v. Gibson, 6 Blackf. 369 (1843).
TITLE G. AUTHORIZATION TO BORROW
Section 74. WHEN AUTTHopTY IS INEUE.
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is not authorized to bor-
row unless such borrowing is usually incident to the perform-
ance of acts which he is authorized to perform for the principal.
Comment:
a. Even though an agent otherwise has wide discretion in
the management of the principal's affairs, the authority to
borrow is seldom inferred except where such authority is in-
cidental to the position held by the agent. Authority to pur-
chase on credit does not include authority to borrow from
third persons to pay for the things purchased; authority to
discount a note does not include authority to borrow, using
the note as collateral security. One appointed to manage
a business does not thereby have authority to borrow, al-
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though such an authority may readily be inferred from the
fact that in similar businesses such borrowing is regularly
done or that in the particular business it has been the usage
to borrow.
b. Although authority to borrow is not ordinarily incident
to the performance of the work of the agent, the circum-
stances surrounding his authorization may indicate that he
is authorized to borrow. Thus, where there are recurring
needs for money to conduct a principal's business, as the
principal knows, the fact that he does not supply sufficient
funds for these is evidence that he intends the agent to bor-
row necessary amounts. Likewise, the authority to borrow
may be inferred where an unexpected contingency arises and
such borrowing is necessary to preserve the principal's busi-
ness interests. In both cases, however, the authority to bor-
row is not inferred unless it is practically indispensable to
the continuance of the principal's business or to prevent a
very considerable loss to the principal and where it is im-
possible to communicate with the principal.
* * *
Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.
Section 75. AUTHORITY INFERRED FROm AUTHORITY TO BoRaow.
Unless otherwise agreed, authority to borrow includes au-
thority:
(a) to borrow from any lender, for delivery to or for the
use of the principal, a reasonable amount in view of the
purposes of the borrowing if no amount is specified, up-
on the terms which are usual, if any, or otherwise up-
on reasonable terms; if no time is specified, for a rea-
sonable time;
(b) to execute in the name of the principal such evidences
of debt as are usually given; and
(c) to make any reasonably necessary representations con-
cerning the credit of the principal which the agent rea.
sonably believes to be true.
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Comment:
a. It is ordinarily inferred that a borrower is not inter-
ested in the personality of the lender; if, however, it has
been the usage of the principal, as the agent has notice, to
borrow only from, or to avoid, a particular person, the agent
is authorized to act only in accordance with the usage. If
no amount is specified, the agent is authorized to use rea-
sonable discretion as to the amount required to carry out
the principal's purposes. Where authority to borrow is in-
ferred because of an emergency, an agent is authorized to
borrow only as much as reasonably can be expected to be
required in taking care of the situation. If the amount or
period of borrowing is specified, there is no authority to
borrow a smaller or greater amount or for a shorter or longer
time, except that an agent authorized to borrow a specific
amount would ordinarily be authorized to borrow from dif-
ferent lenders smaller amounts making up the total, and an
authority to borrow for a specified time includes authority
to specify an option for prepayments or for an extension of
time.
_b. It is inferred that one having authority to borrow has
authority to do what is reasonably necessary in obtaining the
money, including the giving of negotiable instruments in the
usual form, if that is required, and the making of such truth-
ful representations concerning the financial position of the
principal as may be demanded by the lender. Compare § 63,
dealing with the power of a purchasing agent, whose powers,
in these respects, are more limited than those of an agent
authorized to borrow.
c. Authority to borrow does not include authority to ap-
ply the money received to any purpose, except delivery to
the principal, unless the agent is otherwise authorized to
spend the principal's money or pay his debts. If the bor-
rowing is authorized or is otherwise within the power of
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the agent, however, the lender is not responsible for the pay-
ment of the amount to the principal or its application to the
principal's uses (see § 165).
d. As in all other agency situations, it is inferred that
the agent is authorized to borrow only for the purposes of
the principal, and a power of attorney, given for the benefit
of the principal, is so interpreted, even though expressed
in the broadest terms (see § 39). If an agent borrows for
an improper purpose, the principal is not liable to a lender
having notice of such purpose; to those who lend without
such notice or who become bona fide purchasers of a nego-
tiable instrument which the agent is authorized to draw for
a proper purpose, the principal is subject to liability (see
§ 165).
Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.
TITLE H. AUTHORIZATION TO MAKE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS
Section 76. WHEN AUTHORITY IS INFERRED.
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is not authorized to
execute or endorse negotiable paper unless such execution or
endorsement is usually incident to the performance of the acts
which he is authorized to perform for the principal.
Comment:
a. Consent to endorse for the purpose of deposit to the
principal's account is more readily inferred than authority
to endorse for other purposes. Authority to draw checks on
the principal's account for the payments of debts incurred
in the principal's business, if under the management of the
agent, is more readily inferred than authority to execute
negotiable promissory notes. An agent authorized to bor-
row money is thereby authorized to execute negotiable in-
struments to the authorized amount if this is usually re-
quired by lenders.
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b. Circumstances creating authority. Although author-
ity to make negotiable instruments is not usually incident
to the performance of the acts which the agent is authorized
to perform, such authority may be inferred from the cir-
cumstances which surround the authorization, as where the
agent is authorized to borrow on account of the principal
and the only feasible means of borrowing is by the execu-
tion of a negotiable instrument. Likewise, the authority to
make a negotiable instrument may be inferred where au-
thority to borrow is created in an emergency (see Comment
b on § 74).
c. Improper motive of agent. It is ordinarily inferred
that an agent is not authorized to make or endorse nego-
tiable instruments except for the principal's purposes. Thus,
an agent is not authorized to execute instruments for his
own account, nor, except for advertising or similar business
purposes, without consideration; nor is an agent authorized,
in the absence of special circumstances, to make accommo-
dation endorsements in the principal's name, even for the
benefit of the principal's business associates. If an agent
makes a negotiable instrument for an improper purpose,
one taking from him with notice has no rights thereon against
the principal; one receiving with notice an instrument be-
longing to the principal endorsed by the agent for an im-
proper purpose, is subject to liability to the principal (see
§§ 166, 312). If the agent is otherwise authorized, however,
the fact that the agent had an improper purpose in making
or endorsing the instrument in the authorized form does not
prevent a bona fide purchaser in due course, or a subsequent
transferee from one, from having the same rights in the
instrument and against the principal as if the agent's act
were authorized (see § 165).
d. Validation by receipt of proceeds. If an agent with-
out authority endorses a negotiable instrument payable to
the principal and the amount of the instrument is credited
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to the principal or otherwise comes to his hands, the prin-
cipal cannot retain the proceeds without validating the un-
authorized act of the agent (see §§ 98-99).
Annotation:
The master and part owner of a boat has no authority to execute bills and
notes for insurance, etc., for use of the boat. Holcroft v. Wilkes, 16 Ind. 373
(1861).
Authority to buy and sell goods does not authorize the drawing and indorsing
of bills and notes. Smith v. Gibson, 6 Blackf. 369 (1843).
Where power to execute bills and notes is reasonably necessary to effectuate
the business authorized, it exists. Exchange Bank of Warren v. Weiner, 92 Ind.
App. 692, 170 N. E. 788 (1930); Swift & Co. v. Miller, 62 Ind. App. 312, 113
N. E. 447 (1916).
The power to collect a note does not authorize the indorsing of a check given
for the principal's use in payment. Robinson v. Bank of Winslow, 42 Ind. App.
350, 85 N. E. 793 (1908); Hamilton Nat. Bank v. Nye, 37 Ind. App. 464, 77
N. E. 295 (1906).
TITLE I. AUTHORIZATION TO DELEGATE OR APPOINT
AGENTS AND SUBAGENTS
Section 77. GENERAL RULE.
The authority to appoint agents or subagents of the prin-
cipal may be conferred in the same manner as authority to do
other acts for ihe principal, and the interpretation of the
manifestations of the principal is governed by the rules stated
in §§ 32-48.
Comment:
a. Authority to appoint others to perform an act may re-
sult from formal writings or informal words, or may be in-
ferred from an appointment to a position or from other con-
duct by the principal manifesting his consent.
An agent authorized to appoint another to perform an
act as a servant or other agent of the principal may be one
who is authorized to perform the act either personally or
by directing another to perform it. Under these circum-
stances he has authority to delegate its performance. On the
other hand, he may be merely an appointing agent with no
authority personally to perform the act in question.
b. An agent authorized to appoint another to act for the
principal may be authorized to appoint either an agent of
the principal, whose relations with the principal are there-
upon the same as if he were directly appointed by the prin-
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cipal, or a subagent who becomes an agent of the agent and
who, although authorized to act for the principal, has no
contractual relations with the principal (see § 5). Whether
or not an agent is authorized to appoint another agent or
a subagent depends upon the manifestations of the prin-
cipal in light of all the circumstances (see §§ 79-80).
Annotation:
The appointment of a subagent is not binding on the principal unless ex-
pressly authorized, or afterwards ratified, or unless authority is reasonably im-
plied. O'Connor v. Arnold, 53 Ind. 203 (1876); Lucas v. Rader, 29 Ind. App.
287, 64 N. E. 488 (1902).
Section 78. INFERENCE AS TO AUTHORIY TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY.
Unless otherwise agreed, authority to conduct a transac-
tion does not include authority to delegate to another the per-
formance of acts incidental thereto which involve discretion
or the agent's special skill; such authority, however, includes
authority to delegate to a subagent the performance of inci-
dental mechanical and ministerial acts.
Comment:
a. The rule stated in this Section is a specific application
of a more general rule that one upon whose discretion, judg-
ment, or skill another relies cannot properly appoint a third
person to perform the duties undertaken by himself (see
§ 18). The relation of principal and agent is a fiduciary one
in which the principal ordinarily relies upon the personal
qualities of the agent; unless the transaction includes no
element of discretion, the one appointed to do the act can-
not appoint another to perform it on account of the prin-
cipal.
b. Even in the performance of purely mechanical or min-
isterial acts, an agent appointed to conduct a transaction is
ordinarily not authorized to appoint another agent for the
principal. He is authorized only to appoint a subagent re-
sponsible to the immediate agent, and for whose acts the
agent is responsible to the principal.
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c. An agent authorized to perform an act may be au-
thorized to appoint other agents for the principal to assist
in its performance under the conditions stated in § 79, or
to appoint subagents to perform it under the conditions
stated in § 80. For the authority of servants to delegate, see
§ 81.
Annotation:
The power to procure insurance for the principal can not be delegated to a
subagent. New v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 171 Ind. 33, 85 N. E. 703, 131 Am.
St. Rep. 245 (1908).
Authority to sell personalty, such as law books, can not be delegated by a
special agent. Lucas v. Rader, 29 Ind. App. 287, 64 N. E. 488 (1902).
Where a mayor makes a subscription for the city council, and the council
only has authority to do so, it is held that the mayor is an instrument or aman-
uensis of the council. The Evansville, Indianapolis & Cleveland Straight Line R.
R. Co. v. The City of Evansville, 15 Ind. 395 (1860).
Section 79. WHEN AuTHoRIy TO APPOINT AN AGENT IS INFERIED.
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is authorized to appoint
another agent for the principal if:
(a) the agent is appointed to a position which, in view of
business customs, ordinarily includes authority to ap-
point other agents;
(b) the proper conduct of the principal's business in the
contemplated manner reasonably requires the employ-
ment of other agents;
(c) the agent is employed to act at a place where or in a
business in which it is customary to employ other
agents for the performance of such acts; or
(d) an unforeseen contingency arises making it impractica-
ble to communicate with the principal and making such
an appointment reasonably necessary for the protec-
tion of the interests of the principal entrusted to the
agent.
Comment:
a. Whether or not the agent is authorized to employ
agents of the principal depends upon the manifestations of
the principal in light of the circumstances, including the
usages of the business and of the parties inter se. The agents
so employed are the agents of the principal and not of the
employing agent, who is not responsible to them for their
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compensation unless he so manifests, and is no more re-
sponsible for their conduct to third persons or to the prin-
cipal than he is for the conduct of other agents of the prin-
cipal, unless he is negligent in their selection (see §§ 358,
405).
b. The appointing agent may be authorized to appoint
other agents subject to his orders as a superior agent or sub-
ject to orders of the principal or other agents of the prin-
cipal; he may be authorized to appoint all agents needed in
the principal's business or only agents of certain types. The
variations in the authority of the appointing agents are so
great that no more definite rules can be stated than those
stated in §§ 32-48 as applicable to the interpretation of au-
thority generally.
Annotation:
(a) No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of
this division of section 79.
(b) The rule stated in this division of sectidn 79 is in accord with the law
of Indiana. Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester, 180 Ind. 357, 101 N. E.
915, L. R. A. 1915E, 721 (1913).
(c) No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
division of section 79.
(d) The rule stated in this division of section 79 is in accord with the law
of Indiana.
It is within the authority of the general officers, such as conductors, of a rail-
way company to supply medical services for injured employees in an emergency.
Cincinnati, I., St. L. & C. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 126 Ind. 99, 25 N. E. 878 (1890);
Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 121 Ind. 353, 22 N. E. 775, 6 L. R. A.
320 (1889); Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Brown, 107 Ind. 336, 8 N. E. 218
(1886); Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. McMurray, 98 Ind. 358, 49 Am. Rep. 752
(1885); Vandalia R. Co. v. Bryan, 60 Ind. App. 223, 110 N. E. 218 (1915);
Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co. v. Mylott, 6 Ind. App. 438, 33 N. E. 135 (1893);
Evansville & R. R. Co. v. Freeland, 4 Ind. App. 207, 30 N. E. 803 (1892).
Section 80. WHEN AUTHORITY TO APPOINT A SUBAGENT IS IN-
FERRED.
Unless otherwise agreed, authority to appoint a subagent
is inferred from authority to conduct a transaction for the
principal for the performance of which the agent is to be re-
sponsible to the principal if:
(a) the authorized transaction cannot lawfully be per-
formed by the agent in person;
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(b) the agent is an association or has an organization, the
employees of which normally perform such transac-
tions;
(c) the business is of such a nature or.is to be conducted
in such a place that it is impracticable for the agent fo
perform it in person;
(d) the appointment of subagents for the performance of
such transactions is usual, or there has been a usage
between the principal and the agent permitting it; or
(e) an unforeseen contingency arises in which it is im-
practicable to communicate with the principal and in
which such an appointment is necessary in order to pro-
tect the interests of the principal entrusted to the
agent.
Comment:
a. The inference stated in this Section exists only where
the agent has undertaken the transaction by his own means
and where he reasonably believes, in view of the circum-
stances under which he undertakes it or which arise during
the performance, that the principal is willing that it be per-
formed by one other than himself. Thus,, although normally
brokers, factors, or attorneys would be authorized to dele-
gate to their employees the performance of the principal's
business, this would not be true if they had reason to know
that the principal was not aware of their business organiza-
tion. Likewise, although ordinarily an agent not an attorney,
if authorized to bring suit, could properly employ an attor-
ney for this purpose, he could not do so if he should realize
that the principal believes that he is an attorney. One em-
ploying a corporation as an agent necessarily knows that
the corporation must act through agents and hence consents
to the use of its employees as subagents.
b. For the distinction between agents and subagents, see
§ 5. For the termination of the subagent's authority, see
§ 137. For the rule as to the power of a subagent to create
relations between the principal and. third persons, see §§ 142,
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318. For the liabilities between principal and subagent, see
§§ 428 (1), 458. For the liabilities of the agent to the prin-
cipal for the conduct of a subagent, see § 406; to third per-
sons, see § 362. For the liabilities of the subagent to the
agent, see § 428 (2); for those of the agent to the subagent,
see § 459.
Annotation:
(a) No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of
this division of section 80.
(b) No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of
this division of section 80.
(c) The rule stated in this division of section 80 is in accord with the law
of Indiana. Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester, 180 Ind. 357, 101 N. E.
915, L. R. A. 1915E, 721 (1913); Iruin v. Reeves Pulley Co., 20 Ind. App. 101,
48 N. E. 601 (1897), rehearing denied, 50 N. E. 317 (1897).
(d) No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of
this division of section 80.
(e) No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of
this division of section 80.
Section 81. AUTHORITY OF SERVANT TO DELEGATE.
Unless otherwise agreed, a servant is not authorized to
permit or employ another to perform acts of service which he
is employed to perform.
Comment:
a. A servant is an agent employed to render service,
whose physical conduct is subject to the control or right
to control of the principal. Such a person ordinarily has no
power to substitute another in the performance of services
which it is his duty to render. However, persons such as
managers or department heads, although within the class
defined as servants (see § 220), ordinarily employ assist-
ants in the prosecution of the master's work. In such cases
the services they are employed to give include the employ-
ment of other persons to perform such subordinate acts as
they do not choose to perform in person. Their authority
in such cases may be to employ either servants or independ-
ent contractors. A servant may be employed primarily to
conduct transactions with third persons, in which case the
service he is required to give may not include the perform-
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ance of the ministerial or mechanical acts connected there-
with, and if it does not, the rule stated in § 79 is applicable.
A servant employed to perform manual work ordinarily has
no authority to direct or permit another to perform it, either
as his servant, as an independent contractor, or as a servant
of the master. Since the master is responsible to third persons
for the torts of a servant in the scope of employment, in the
situations in which a servant is authorized to secure assist-
ance, ordinarily he would be authorized to employ only a
person who becomes his servant or an independent contrac-
tor, and not a servant of the master.
b. If a servant is authorized to substitute another serv-
ant of the principal, such substituted servant has power to
subject the principal to liability as would any other of the
principal's servants. On the other hand, if the servant is not
authorized to substitute another for himself, the principal
is not subject to liability to third persons for the conduct
of such person, unless the agent has been negligent in en-
trusting an instrumentality of the principal to such person
or if, surrendering its immediate control to the other, he
retains supervision over him and is negligent in his super-
vision (see § 241).
Annotation:






Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a prior act
which did not bind him but which was done or professedly
done on his account, whereby the act, as to some or all persons,
is given effect as if originally authorized by him.
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Comment:
a. The word "ratification" as defined in this Section is
inapplicable to situations where the original act was au-
thorized or where, although it was not authorized, the one
acting had power to make the principal a party to the trans-
action because the act done was Within his apparent author-
ity or was otherwise within the scope of his agency or em-
ployment, under the rules stated in §§ 159-185. If an agent
improperly has made his principal a party to a transaction
or improperly has acquired property for his principal, the
principal can affirm the transaction with the consequences
stated in Comment b on § 416.
b. Ratification is not a form of authorization but its
peculiar characteristic is that ordinarily it has the same ef-
fect as authorization; upon ratification the consequences of
the original transaction are the same as if it had been au-
thorized, except in favor of persons who, because of their
wrongful conduct, are not entitled to benefit, and against
persons who have meanwhile acquired interests with which
it would be unjust to interfere (see §§ 100-102). It is not
a contract and may result, therefore, from a subsequent
affirmance without either consideration or a fresh consent
by the purported agent or by the person with whom such
agent has dealt (see § 92). It differs from equitable estoppel
in that no change of position by the third person is re-
quired to subject the principal to liability, and where a con-
tract is ratified there is a contract between the principal
and the third person and not merely a liability created
against the principal. Although there has been no ratifica-
tion because of the lack of a required element, there may be
estoppel (see § 103), or a contractual or quasi-contractual
liability (see § 104).
c. There is not a change in legal relations as if there had
been initial authorization, and hence there is no ratification
unless an act has 'been done which the purported or intended
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principal could have authorized (see § 84), by one who pur-
ported to act as agent or intended to act as servant (see
§ 85); and unless the act is affirmed (see §§ 93-99), while
still capable of ratification (see §§ 88-90), by a person who,
at the time of affirmance, knows the facts (see § 91), who
can authorize such an act (see § 86), and who is the person
for whom the agent purported or intended to act (see § 87).
Annotation:
A ratification is an agreement to adopt an act performed by another for the
one who agrees to adopt. Haggerty v. Juday, 58 Ind. 154 (1877).
Ratification means adoption of that which was done for or in the name of
another without authority. Bailey v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 72 Ind.
App. 84, 121 N. E. 128 (1918); National Life Ins. Co. v. Headrick, 63 Ind. App.
54, 112 N. E. 559 (1916).
The acts, words and silence of the principal are sometimes spoken of as In
themselves constituting ratification; but this is not strictly accurate. They are
rather the evidence of ratification than the ratification itself. Minnick v. Darling,
8 Ind. App. 539, 36 N. E. 173 (1894).
Section 83. ArcnmANcE.
Affirmance is a manifestation of an election by the one on
whose account an unauthorized act has been performed to
treat the act as authorized, or conduct by him justifiable only
if there is such an election.
Comment:
a, The affirmance results in ratification only if the act
is ratifiable and the affirmance is made under the proper
conditions and in the proper manner.
b. The affirmance may consist either of a manifestation
of consent to be a party to the previous transaction, or a
manifestation that such consent has been given. Such mani-
festation is effective when made although not communicated
to the third person or to others, except where the third per-
son changes his position believing that it has not been made
(see § 95). Conduct which is justifiable only if there is ratifi-
cation constitutes an affirmance under the conditions stated
in §§ 97-99.
Annotation:
A principal may affirm or disaffirm at his pleasure, when informed of the
fact; but his affirmance Is not presumed, unless, from his conduct, his acts, or
his words, such an inference may reasonably be drawn. Wallace v. Morgan, 23
Ind. 399 (1864).
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Topic 2. When Affirmance Results in Ratification
Section 84. WuAT AcTs CAN BE RATIFIED.
(1) Subject to the rules stated in §§ 85-87, an act which,
when done, the purported or intended principal could have au-
thorized, he can ratify, except an act the ratification of which
is against public policy.
(2) An act which, when done, the purported or intended
principal could not have authorized, he cannot ratify, except an
act affirmed by a legal representative whose appointment re-
lates back to or before the time of such act.
Comment:
a. Nature of the act. If, by a manifestation of consent,
one may create a power in another to affect him by doing
an act on his account, and such an act is purported or in-
tended to be done for another person, the act is subject to
ratification. Since ratification, like authorization, affects the
relations between the principal, agent, and third person, the
same rules apply to the ratification of acts as apply to their
authorization, as to which see §§ 17-19. Thus, if the per-
formance of an act by one who has been directed to do it
on account of another would, ;at the time of performance,
have no legal consequences as to third persons, the affirm-
ance of such act done without authority results in no legal
consequences as to such third persons. It is immaterial that
by reason of change of law at the time of affirmance such
act, if then authorized, would have legal consequences, un-
less the change in law is, by statute, retroactive.
In the absence of retroactive legislation, if the act done
would be illegal although authorized, it is affected by the
illegality when it is affirmed, although at the time of affirm-
ance such act could have been validly authorized (see § 100).
A transaction which, if authorized, would have been void-
able because of mistake on the part of the purported agent
or fraud by the other party to the transaction, is subject to
ratification, the ratification normally having the double ef-
fect of making the principal a party thereto and preventing
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subsequent rescission by him for the mistake or fraud; if
the purported agent has defrauded the other party, the
principal may ratify the transaction, but he is subject to
the liabilities and defenses resulting from the fraud.
Upon the subsequent affirmance of a transaction which
was tortious, criminal, or otherwise illegal because, and only
because, the purported agent was not authorized, ratification
results as if the act had not been illegal, as far as the legal
relations between the parties are concerned, except to the
extent that to permit the affirmance to result in ratification
would have a tendency to obstruct criminal justice or other-
wise be against public policy.
* * *
b. Incapacity of principal. Except in the case of a repre-
sentative (see Comment c), an act is not capable of ratifica-
tion unless the person acting purports or intends to act for
a person who, at the time of the act, has capacity to author-
ize such an act. Thus, the affirmance by a person not in
existence at the time of the original act does not result in
ratification. Likewise, where a contract is purported to be
made on account of one who, because of mental incom-
petency or coverture, has no capacity to authorize such con-
tract, an affirmance after the disability has ceased does not
result in ratification, since a transaction conducted by him
personally while so incapacitated cannot subsequently be
effectively affirmed. Such affirmance may, however, result in
the same liabilities on the part of the purported principal
as if there were ratification, because of estoppel (see § 103),
or it may result in a new contract (see § 104).
Where an act is done for a person who is competent to
authorize such a transaction but which, if authorized, he
could avoid because of his partial incapacity, the act may
be ratified by him, subject to the same voidability if the
partial disability still remains; affirmance after the partial
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disability is removed normally has the effect of preventing
a subsequent disaffirmance by the purported principal (see
Comment d on § 100).
c. Ratification by executors and similar representatives.
An executor, administrator, assignee, trustee in bankruptcy,
or other representative whose title, when appointed, relates
back to an earlier time, can ratify acts which he could have
authorized had he been appointed at such earlier time.
The capacity of an executor or administrator to ratify
acts done in the lifetime of and for the decedent, or of an
assignee in bankruptcy to ratify acts done by one purport-
ing to act for the bankrupt before the bankruptcy, is not
dealt with in the Restatement of this Subject.
The power of an agent to ratify an act done on account
of his principal previous to his appointment is stated in
Comment c on § 93.
Annotation:
Subsection 1. A contract that is ratified must be one that the parties might
lawfully have made in the first instance. Minnich v. Darling, 8 Ind. App. S39,
36 N. E. 173 (1894).
Public officers clothed with statutory duties may not delegate such authority
nor ratify the attempts of unauthorized persons to perform those duties, such
as levying taxes. Shepardson v. Gillette, 133 Ind. 125, 31 N. E. 788 (1892).
Subsection 2. No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject
matter of this subsection.
Section 85. PURPORTING To ACT As AGENT AS A REQUISITE.
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), ratification does not
result from the affirmance of an act, unless the one acting pur-
ports to act on account of another.
(2) An act of service not involving a transaction with a
third person is subject to ratification if, but only if, the one
doing the act intends or purports to perform it as the servant
of another.
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Comment on Subsection (1):
a. Under the rule stated in this Subsection, a ratifica-
tion does not result from the affirmance of an unauthorized
contract or representation made by a person intending to
act for another whose existence is not disclosed to the third
person. Likewise, under the rule stated in this Subsection,
there can be no ratification where a person makes a contract
in the name of another whom he impersonates, or when one
signs a document representing that the signature is that of
another person. In such case, however, if the person whose
identity or signature is simulated leads the deceived person
to believe that the transaction was as represented and con-
sequently to change this position, he is subject to liability
on the ground of estoppel (see § 103).
b. It is not necessary that the purported principal be
identified; it is sufficient that the person acting should pur-
port to act as agent for another. But if he describes the other
by name or otherwise, only a person coming within the de-
scription so given, if any, can ratify. If the description ap-
plies to two persons equally, only the one on whose account
he intends to act can ratify (see § 87).
c. Purporting to act on account of another does not neces-
sarily mean that the agent represents to the third person
that the principal has authorized him to act on his account
in the transaction. A person purports to act on account of an-
other if he undertakes to act on his behalf and to make the
other a party to the transaction, although the person acting
may also manifest to the third person that he does not know
whether or not he is authorized, or even that he is not au-
thorized. This situation should be distinguished from that
in which one purports merely to undertake to transmit an
offer to another. Whether in a particular situation there is
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an intent to make a present agreement subject to ratification
or a mere offer which may be accepted depends upon the
understanding of the parties.
d. Two situations are to be distinguished. The first is
where an agent tortiously sells to third persons, as his own,
chattels belonging to the principal; the second, where an
agent has defrauded a principal in contracting with him. In
the first of these cases the principal has an election to bring
an action for conversion against the agent or an action of
assumpsit for the amount received by him from the pur-
chaser. If the principal chooses the second alternative, his
action is such an affirmance that thereafter he cannot main-
tain the action for conversion against the purchaser which
he ordinarily would have. In the second case, the principal
has an election to rescind the transaction with the agent or,
affirming by keeping what he has received, to hold the agent
responsible for damages, if any. In neither of these situations
does the affirmance constitute a ratification as that word is
used herein.
Comment on Subsection (2):
e. The affirmance of an isolated act, or of a transaction
involving promises and representations to third persons, does
not cause the person affirming to be subject to liability there-
for, unless the one acting purported to act on account of an-
other. On the other hand, if acts of service are rendered with
intent, though unexpressed, to perform them as servant for
another and the other affirms, the ordinary consequences of
the relation of master and servant follow if the conditions
stated in §§ 86-92 are satisfied. As to the necessity of know-
ing the facts in affirming unauthorized service, see § 91.
* * *
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Annotation:
Subsection 1. The person who acts as agent must purport to be the agent
of the principal and the contract must be made on the faith and credit of the
principal. Minnich v. Darling, 8 Ind. App. 539, 36 N. E. 173 (1894).
When the person making the contract has no authority to contract for the
third person (principal), and he does not purport to act for the third person
at the time, it seems that the subsequent assent of such third person, to bind
him as principal, is of no operative effect. Crowder v. Reed, 80 Ind. 1 (1881)..
".... no act is capable of ratification by the principal which was not per-
formed by the agent as agent, and in behalf of the principal." 1 PARsoNs ON
CONTRACTS 346, quoted in Meiners v. Munson, 53 Ind. 138, 143 (1876).
Subsection 2. No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject
matter of this subsection.
Section 86. ILLEGA.ITY OR LACK OF CAPACITY AT TImE OF AF-
FIRACE.
(1) A transaction capable of ratification can be ratified if,
but only if, the purported principal can authorize such a trans-
action at the time of affirmance, except as stated in Subsection
(2).
(2) If, by a change in law, a transaction, lawful when done,
has become so unlawful that an attempt thereafter to author-
ize it would be void, the transaction may nevertheless be rat-
ified if it is not against the present public policy to enforce
rights resulting from it.
Comment:
a. Nature of the act. If, by a change of law, an act
which was capable of delegation when it was performed can
no longer be delegated, there can be no ratification, except
as stated in Subsection (2). Likewise, if an act is affirmed
upon a day or at a place in which such act could not be au-
thorized, the affirmance does not result in ratification.
Whether or not it is against public policy to enforce rights
resulting from a transaction which, if now entered into,
would be unlawful, but which was lawful at the time it was
entered into, depends upon whether or not the unexecuted
portion of the transaction offends the present public policy
which makes such a transaction illegal. If it does offend
present public policy, the affirmance of the transaction does
not result in ratification; if it does not offend, the purported
principal may ratify it. Thus, if a purported agent delivers
and purports to sell goods of the principal on credit, a ratifi-
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cation of the transaction after the enactment of a statute
which prohibits the sale of such goods would not offend the
policy of the law which is directed primarily against the
sale and delivery, and not against the receipt of the price.
On the other hand, if the purported agent had received a
payment for the goods in advance but had not delivered
them, his principal would not, by affirming, subject himself
to liability for failure to make delivery.
b. Capacity oj purported principal. A person has capac-
ity to ratify an act if at the time of affirmance he has capac-
ity to authorize such an act. If he has only partial capacity
at the time, as in the case of an infant, his ratification is sub-
ject to the same limitations as would be his authorization.
On the other hand, although, as stated in § 84, one of full
capacity cannot ratify an act done when he had no capacity,
a person who had only partial capacity when the act was
done may, upon the removal of the partial incapacity, ratify
as completely as if he had had full capacity at the time when
the act was done (see Comment d on § 100).
Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.
Section 87. WHO CAN ArFiRm.
To become effective as ratification, the affirmance must be
by the person identified as the principal at the time of the
original act or, if no person was then identified, by the one
for whom the agent intended to act.
Comment:
a. As stated in § 85, it is necessary for the ratification of
a transaction with a third person that the person acting
should purport to act as agent. If he then identifies the pur-
ported principal, it is only the affirmance of such person
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which can result in ratification. If the agent purports to act
for a partially disclosed principal and gives no description,
only the person intended by the agent can ratify; if a partial
description is given, only a person who comes within it and
who was intended by the agent can ratify. Where one in-
tends to act as, servant, only the person on whose account
the service was purported to be done or was intended can
ratify it.
b. If the purported principal is identified, the fact that the
agent intended to act entirely on his own account, making
unauthorized use of the principal's name for his own ac-
commodations, does not prevent the purported principal
from ratifying.
Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana. Hwy
v. Heeb, 114 Ind. 275, 16 N. E. 606, 5 Am, St. Rep. 613 (1888); Crowder v.
Reed, 80 Ind. 1 (1881); Meiners v. Munson, 53 Ind. 138 (1876); Reeves & Co.
v. Miller, 48 Ind. App. 339, 95 N. E. 677 (1911).
Section 88. AFFIRmANCE AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF THIRD PERSON
OR OTHER TERMINATION OF ORIGINAL TRANSACTION.
To constitute ratification, the affirmance of a transaction
must be before the third person has manifested his withdrawal
from it either to the purported principal or to the agent, and
before the offer or agreement has otherwise terminated or
been discharged.
Comment:
a. Withdrawal by third person. Until affirmance, the re-
lationship of the third person to the purported principal is
similar to that of an offeror to an offeree. Before such time,
therefore, the third person is free to withdraw, either be-
cause he discovers that the principal has not authorized the
transaction or for any other reason. This is so although the
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agent has not represented that he is authorized, and al-
though the other party has contracted with the agent that
he will not withdraw.
An agreement with the purported agent to terminate the
transaction, or other conduct manifesting to the agent or
to the principal that the third person no longer consents to
the transaction, constitutes a withdrawal. Action begun by
the third person against the purported agent for breach of
warranty of authority is such a manifestation unless at the
time the third person indicates that the transaction is to re-
main open.
b. Termination of transaction. The transaction may
have terminated because there were no remaining rights or
duties according to its terms, as where it has become im-
possible of execution or where other events have happened
which discharge it.
The transaction between the purported agent and the
third person may consist of an offer by one to the other; if
the offer lapses, or is withdrawn, a later affirmance cannot
result in a contract. If, however, the third person makes an
offer to the purported agent which the latter purports to
accept for the principal, it is not essential that the affirm-
ance by the principal come within the time when the offer
would have lapsed without such acceptance.
c. Death or loss of capacity of third person. The death
or loss of capacity of the other party to a transaction with
the purported agent terminates the power of the purported
principal to ratify. If, at the time of the affirmance, the third
person has such partial capacity that he can make a con-
tract which can be avoided by him, the affirmance by the
purported principal with knowledge of the facts creates a
contract subject to avoidance by the third person.
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Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.
Section 89. AFIRMANCE AFTER CHANGE OF CONDITIONS.
At the election of the third person, an affirmance of a trans-
action with him is not effective as ratification if it occurs after
the situation has so materially changed that it would be ih-
equitable to subject him to liability thereon.
Comment:
a. The affirmance, in cases covered by the rule stated in
this Section, results in ratification unless the third person
upon learning the facts elects to withdraw from the trans-
action. If he does withdraw, the affirmance by the principal,
in spite of such withdrawal, may have the effect of condon-
ing the act of the agent, if the agent was subject to liability
for having done an unauthorized act (see § 409 for the ef-
fect of condonation).
b. A material change.in the situation of the third person
may be caused by a conveyance by him of the subject mat-
ter between the time of the transaction and of its affirm-
ance, or by his assumption of obligations to other persons
with which the ratification will interfere.
c. A lapse of time with such a change in conditions that
the promise of the principal is entirely disproportionate in
value to that of the third person may make it inequitable to
enforce the transaction against a third person. Likewise, if
the transaction, had it occurred at the time of the affirmance,
would have been substantially different from that entered
into, this change being detrimental to the third person, the
affirmance may not bind him as a ratification. In aleatory
transactions, which are based upon the uncertainty of the
existence or happening of events because of the lack of
knowledge of the parties, the acquisition of knowledge by
the purported principal that an event has occurred which
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renders absolute the promise of the third person would
make it inequitable to cause an affirmance thereafter to
operate as ratification, unless before such time the third per-
son has received the consideration for his promise or un-
less he assumed the risk that the agent was unauthorized.
* * *
d. A change in the situation after affirmance is immateri-
al, except that if the affirmance is not communicated and the
third person changes his position in the belief that there has
been no affirmance, he may avoid its effect.
Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.
Section 90. AFIRMANcE OF DEMANDS AND NOTrIFIcATIoNs.
If the purported principal has a power to change his rela-
tions with a third person by the making of demand or the giv-
ing of notification before a specified time, the affirmance after
such time of a demand or a notification purported to be made
on his account before such time is ineffective at the election
of the third person.
Comment:
a. The doctrine of ratification with its characteristic fea-
ture of relation back does not operate to deprive other per-
sons of the protection to which they are entitled. This ap-
plies not only to persons who are not parties to the transac-
tion (see § 101), but also to the other party to the transac-
tion. If the purported principal has a right against another
conditioned upon giving him a notification or making a de-
mand upon him, the act of a purported agent who does not
have power to act for the principal in giving the notifica-
tion or making the demand is not the act which is required
to make the principal's right effective. An affirmance given
at a time when such a demand or notification would be in-
effective is inoperative unless the third person acquiesces.
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Thus, a notification of dishonor and a demand for payment
given to an endorser by a person not a party to the nego-
tiable instrument on behalf of a subsequent holder is in-
effective if affirmed after the time when such demand or
notification would operate to charge the endorser. Likewise,
if a person has alternate rights against another which are
determined by giving notification or making a demand, a
stranger cannot make the choice effective; the affirmance
of an election purported to be on behalf of the principal
must be made within the time when the choice is to be made,
as in the case of options, or notifications to or by landlords
or tenants to terminate a lease.
Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dialing with the subject matter of this
section.
Section 91. KNOWLEDGE OF PRINCIPAL AT TrmE or AypnzmANcE.
If, at the time of affirmance, the purported principal is ig-
norant of material facts involved in the original transaction,
he may elect to avoid the effect of the affirmance, unless he
then manifests a willingness to affirm regardless of the in-
completeness of his knowledge.
Comment:
a. Where afflrmanci is not avoided. The fact that the
purported principal has an election to avoid the transaction
because of his lack of knowledge does not prevent the af-
firmance from resulting in ratification, the other requisites
of ratification being present, if he does not elect to avoid it.
b. Mistake of fact by principal alone. In other con-
sensual transactions, lack of knowledge by both parties as
to the essential facts upon which the transaction is based
constitutes a ground for rescission, but where manifestations
of consent have been exchanged creating a contract, ordi-
narily the mistake of one of the parties not induced by a
misrepresentation of the other is not a ground for rescission.
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A contract which results from ratification, however, may be
rescinded by the person affirming, if he affirms under a uni-
lateral mistake as to a material fact; unless he assumes the
risk of mistake, or unless the third person has changed his
position in reliance upon the ratification.
c. Where principal has reason to know. The fact that
the principal has reason to know or, for other purposes,
should know the material facts of which he is ignorant, does
not prevent him from electing to avoid the affirmance. How-
ever, knowledge by the purported principal may be inferred
as in other cases; when he has such information that a per-
son of ordinary intelligence would infer the existence of the
facts in question, the triers of fact ordinarily would find that
he had knowledge of such fact. Likewise, if the purported
principal manifests that he affirms when he should know of
the facts, it may be inferred that he assumes the risk of
mistake (see Comment e). Furthermore, he may be estopped
from rescinding the affirmance if the third person has
changed his position in reliance thereon (see § 103).
A principal may be affected by the knowledge of an au-
thorized agent under the rules stated in §§ 268-283. He is
not. however, affected by the knowledge of the person who
did the unauthorized act as to the facts involved in the
transaction, even though such person'is an agent whose duty
it would be to report to the principal all the facts concern-
ing the transaction.
d. What facts are material. There is no right to rescind
a ratification for ignorance of facts, unless such facts so af-
fect the existence and extent of the obligations involved in
the transaction that knowledge of them is essential to an
intelligent election to become a party to the transaction.
Knowledge of the legal effect of the affirmance is not ma-
terial; nor is knowledge of the legal effect of facts material,
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except where a mistake of law causes a. mistake of a ma-
terial fact, such as a mistake -as to ownership. Where the
original transaction is a contract, the material facts include
the parties, the conditions, the material representations of
the agent or the third person when making the contract,
and the consideration. Facts concerning the value of the
subject matter of the contract but merely affecting the de-
sirability of entering into the contract are not of themselves
material. However, a misrepresentation by the third person,
innocent or otherwise, which would permit the rescission of
the contract, entitles the principal to avoid the effect of his
affirmance based upon such representation. Likewise, if
there is a mutual mistake as to a fact assumed as the basis
of the transaction, such that there can be rescission of the
contract under the rules stated in the Restatement of Con-
tracts, § 502, the principal may avoid the effect of the af-
firmance.
In the case of transactions other than contracts, facts are
material if their existence or non-existence would substan-
'tially alter the rights or liabilities of the parties if the trans-
action had been authorized.
e. When Principal assumes risk of lack of knowledge.
Where the purported principal is shown to have knowledge
of the facts which would lead a person of ordinary prudence
to investigate further, and he fails to make such investiga-
tion, his affirmance without qualification is evidence that he
is willing to ratify upon the knowledge which he has. Like-
wise, if, learning that one who had no authority acted for
him, he affirms without qualification and without investiga-
tion, when he has reason to believe that he does not know all
the facts, it may be inferred that he is willing to assume the
risks of facts of which he has no knowledge.
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The unqualified affirmance of acts of service, during the
course of which the purported principal has reason to be-
lieve that there may have been a. variety of unknown in-
cidents, raises the inference that he is willing to take the
risk of the completeness and accuracy of such knowledge
as he has, except as to events not likely to happen. Whether
or not an event is so extraordinary that it is inferred that
he did not intend to risk its occurence is a question to be de-
cided by the triers of fact.
Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana. Metzger
v. Huntington, 13Q Ind. 501, 37 N. E. 1034 (1894), petition for rehearing over-
ruled, 39 N. E. 235 (1894) ; Davis v. Talbot, 137 Ind. 235, 36 N. E. 1098 (1894);
United States Exp. Co. v. Rawson, 106 Ind. 215, 6 N. E. 337 (1886).
As to the effect of a mistake in an architect's report to a board of county
commissioners. see Eigemann v. Board of Commissioners of Posey County, 82
Ind. 413 (1882).
Where an agent is authorized to buy for cash only, and buys on credit, an
acceptance and use of the goods by the principal, without knowledge that they
were bouzht on credit, is not a ratification. Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399
(1866); Gage v. Pike, Smith 145 (1848).
Authority to weigh and deliver goods to buyer does not give authority to
warrant the quality of the goods; and an acceptance of the agent's report that
he has weighed and delivered the goods is no evidence of a ratification by the
principal of a warranty of which the principal was ignorant. Richmond Trading
& Mfg. Co. v. Farquar, 8 Blackf. 89 (1846).
A corporation may be held to have ratified unauthorized acts of its officers,
where the directors have knowledge, or in the discharge of their duties ought
to have knowledge, of the facts. Seymour Improvement Co. v. Viking Sprinkler
Co., 87 Ind. App. 179, 161 N. E. 389 (1928).
There can be no ratification of an unauthorized contract unless the principal
has knowledge of all the material facts. Methodist Episcopal Hospital, etc., v.
Ways Sanitarium Co., 85 Ind. App. 268, 149 N. E. 101 (1925); Evans v. Shep-
hard, 81 Ind. App. 147, 142 N. E. 730 (1924); Kline v. Indiana Trust Co., 74
Ind. App. 351, 125 N. E. 434 (1929); Crumpacker v. Jeffrey, 63 Ind. App. 621,
115 N. E. 62 (1917); National Life Ins. Co. v. Headrick, 63 Ind. App. 54, 112
N. E. 559 '(1916); Reeves & Co. v. Miller, 48 Ind. App. 339, 95 N. E. 677
(1911); Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Scribner, 47 Ind. App. 621, 93 N. E.
1014 (1911); Willison v. McKain, 12 Ind. App. 78, 39 N. E. 886 (1895).
Section 92. EVENTS NOT REQUIRED FOR AND NOT PREVENTING
RATIFICATION.
The affirmance by the principal of a transaction with a third
person is not prevented from resulting in ratification by the
fact:
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(a) that the third person does not give fresh consent to
the transaction at or after the affirmance, or does not
change his position because of it;
(b) that the purported principal, before affirming, had re-
pudiated the transaction, if the third person has not
acted or has failed to act in reliance upon the repudia-
tion;
(c) that the third person had a cause of action against the
agent because of a breach of warranty or a misrepre-
sentation by the agent as to his authority to conduct
the original transaction; or
(d) that the agent conducting the transaction has died or
lost capacity.
Comment on Clause (a):
a. Where the transaction is a contract, the affirmance by
the purported principal, like the acceptance of an offer, is
the final act that brings the principal and the third person
into contractual relations. The consent of the other has al-
ready been manifested to the purported agent, and except
where there is affirmance without inquiry as to the transac-
tion entered into, the consent has been communicated to
the principal either by the agent or otherwise. In many cases
the unauthorized act performed for the principal is unilat-
eral, such as the giving of notice, in which the participation
of the third person is purely passive.
Comment on Clause (b):
b. The fact that the principal repudiates the transaction
and communicates this repudiation to the third person does
not prevent a subsequent affirmance by him from operating
as a ratification; the repudiation does not have the effect
which a rejection or a counter offer has of destroying the
power of an offeree to accept an offer. If, however, the third
person, although desirous of terminating, the transaction,
has failed to give notification of his withdrawal, relying up-
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on the continuance of the principal's repudiation, or has
otherwise changed his position in reliance upon it, he may
elect to treat the repudiation as final.
* * *
Comment on Clause (c):
c. If a person has a cause of action, ordinarily he does
not lose it through the conduct of others for whose conduct
he is not responsible. Furthermore, ordinarily if a transac-
tion is effected by the deceit of a purported agent, the ratifi-
cation by the purported principal does not prevent the dis-
affirmance of the transaction by the defrauded person. The
rule stated in Clause (c) operates as an exception to both
of these generally operative principles. Thus, the fact that
the third person has a cause of action against the agent
either for a breach of warranty of authority or for the
agent's deceit, does not prevent an affirmance from operat-
ing as a ratification although the third person thereby loses
the claim which he had against the purported agent. Like-
wise, the fact that the agent was fraudulent in representing
that he was authorized does not prevent the transaction,
from being binding upon the third person when the prin-
cipal affirms. In both of these cases, the conduct of the agent
leads to no damage if the principal affirms, since the defect
in the authorization is thereby cured, as stated in § 100.
If the third person has indicated withdrawal from the trans-
action by instituting suit against the agent or by setting up
a defense based upon the agent's lack of authorization, a
subsequent affirmance is ineffective (see § 88).
Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.
Topic 3. What Constitutes Affirmance
Section 93. METHODS AND FORMALITIES OF AFFIRMANCE
(1) Except as-stated in Subsection (2), affirmance may be
established by any conduct of the purported principal mani-
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festing that he consents to be a party to the transaction, or
by conduct justifiable only if there is ratification.
(2) Where formalities are requisite for the authorization
of an act, its affirmance must be by the same formalities in
order to constitute a ratification.
(3) The affirmance may be made by an agent authorized
so to do.
Comment on Subsection (1):
a. The affirmance may be expressed by a formal writing,
as by a power of attorney, by spoken words, or by any other
conduct indicating that the purported principal accepts the
original act as having been done on his account. As stated
in § 94, his failure to take action after knowing of the trans-
action may indicate his consent thereto. Where the purport-
ed principal takes a position which is ukjustifiable unless he
consents, such conduct in connection with his accompany-
ing statements may or may not indicate his approval of the
act and if not, ratification is effected at the election of the
third person, not because of his consent, but in spite of non-
consent (see §§ 98-99).
Comment on Subsection (2):
b. Where a seal, writing, or other formality is required
for the authorization of an act, the same requirement is
made for its ratification by consent.
Sections 28-30 state the situation in which particular for-
malities are required for authorization. As therein stated, if
the transaction is a contract under seal, a sealed affirmance is
necessary to validate the agreement as a covenant. But an
oral affirmance, just as an oral authorization, may be suffi-
cient to render the agreement binding as a simple contract,
and an oral affirmance of a deed of land may be sufficient
to render the deed binding on the purported principal as
a memorandum of a contract to convey (see § 29).
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Comment on Subsection (3):
c. An agent may be authorized to ratify for his principal
the previous unauthorized act of himself or of another agent.
Prima facie, an agent authorized to delegate to another the
performance of a transaction or to effect a result is author-
ized to ratify the unauthorized performance of the trans-
action or accomplishment of a result by such other if the
effect of the transaction is not apparently disadvantageous
to the principal at the time of the affirmance. Likewise, one
authorized to effect a result is normally thereby authorized
to ratify a transaction conducted by another which accom-
plishes such result, if no greater burden is placed upon the
principal than if the result had been accomplished as di-
rected. An agent authorized to conduct a transaction is not,
however, thereby prima facie authorized to ratify a prior
unauthorized act of his own; if his unauthorized conduct
created rights in the principal against him, as would be true
where he had acted disobediently while employed as an
agent or had misused the principal's things, the principal
is entitled to know the facts, as in other cases where the in-
terests of the agent may be adverse to those of the prin-
cipal.
Annotation:
Subsection 1. The methods by which a contract may be ratified are as num-
erous and various as the methods by which a contract may be made without the
intervention of an agent. Minnick v. Darling, 8 Ind. App. 539, 36 K. E. 173
(1894).
Subsection 2. No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject
matter of this subsection.
Subsection 3. An agent who had authority to authorize the act in advance
has been held to have authority to ratify the act so as to bind the principal.
United States Express Co. v. Rawson. 106 !pd. 215, 6 N. E. 337 (1886).
An agent who had no authority to appoint subagents has been held not to
have authority to ratify acts of his appointee so as to bind the principal. Thomp-
son v. Michigan Mvt. Life Ins. Co., 56 Ind. App. 502, 109 N. E. 780 (1914).
The act of one who purports to act as agent for a corporation can be ratified
by the acts of the managing agent having authority to ratify. Indiana Union
Traction Co. v. Scribner, 47 Ind. App. 621, 93 N. E. 1014 (1911).
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Section 94. FAILURE TO ACT AS AFFIRmAwCE.
An affirmance of an unauthorized transaction may be in-
ferred from a failure to repudiate it.
Comment:
a. Silence under such circumstances that, according to
the ordinary experience and habits of men, one would nat-
urally be expected to speak if he did not consent, is evidence,
from which assent may be inferred. Such inference may be
drawn although the purported principal had no knowledge
that the third person would rely upon the supposed author-
ity of the agent; his knowledge of such fact, however,
coupled with his silence, would ordinarily justify an inference
of assent by him. Whether or not such an inference is to be
drawn is a question for the jury, unless the case is so clear
that reasonable men could come to but one conclusion.
b. Acquiescence may be inferred from silence, even
though the purported agent was theretofore a stranger to the
purported principal. Nevertheless, the latter's silence is usu-
ally more significant where an agency relationship already
exists and the agent in the particular case has exceeded his
powers. If such an agent reports the matter to the principal
at a time or in a manner calculated to call for dissent if the
principal were unwilling to affirm, the latter's failure to
dissent, if unexplained, furnishes sufficient evidence of af-
firmance.
c. If a third person, who has had dealings with a pur-
ported agent, reports these to the purported principal under
circumstances which reasonably justify an inference of con-
sent unless the principal discloses his dissent, the failure
of the principal to dissent within a reasonable time is, un-
less explained, sufficient evidence of affirmance.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
d. Although the circumstances are such that the silence
of the purported principal does not indicate his affirmance,
his failure to manifest a repudiation may subject him to
liability to one who, as he knows, is acting in the belief that
there has been authorization or ratification (see § 103).
e. Where ratification can be effected only by a formality
(see § 93), acquiescence in an unauthorized act does not
result in ratification. There may, however, be estoppel in
such cases (see § 103).
Annotation:
Ratification by the principal of the acts of agent may be inferred from facts and
circumstances. Public Savings Ins. Co. v. Greenwald, 68 Ind. App. 609, 118 N. E.
556 (1918).
Where the principal, when informed of all facts as to prices, etc., does not
repudiate any unauthorized purchases made by the agent for him, this is a rati-
fication. Welker v. Appleman, 44 Ind. App. 699, 90 N. E. 35 (1909).
Where a railway company had full information concerning employment of
a physician by a conductor, and did not notify the physician of repudiation,
failure to do so was held a ratification. Terre Haute & Indianapolis R. Co. V.
Stockwell, 118 Ind. 98, 20 N. E. 650 (1889).
Ratification by a corporation may be inferred from passive acquiesence. Na-
tional Life Ins. Co. v. Headrick, 63 Ind. App. 54, 112 N. E. 559 (1916), approved
in Bailey v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 72 Ind. App. 84, 121 N. E.
128 (1918).
Silence by a party, with knowledge of what has been done for him in his
name, is evidence of ratification, of more or less force according to the circum-
stances under which it occurs. Haggerty v. Juday, 58 Ind. 154 (1877), approved
in City of Hammond v. Evans, 23 Ind. App. 501, 55 N. E. 784 (1899).
When fully informed of the facts, it is the duty of the principal either to
affirm or disaffirm, and, if he fails to do so, affirmation may be inferred from
his silence. Wallace v. Morgan, 23 Ind. 399 (1864).
Where the principal objected to his agent who had exceeded his authority,
but did not repudiate to the third person, with whom the principal thought the
agent was in communication, it was held that there was no ratification. Strong v.
Ross, 33 Ind. App. 586, 71 N. E. 918 (1904).
Section 95. NEcEssIT OF COMMUNICATING MANIFESTATION OF
AYFUIPANCE.
The manifestation of a definitive election by the principal
constitutes affirmance without communication thereof to the
agent, to the third person, or to other persons.
Comment:
a. To establish ratification, it is necessary to establish
by competent evidence an election by the purported prin-
cipal to be a party to the transaction. This evidence is or-
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dinarily supplied by- his manifestation to the agent or to the
third person. However, the essence of affirmance is the de-
termination of the purported principal to adopt the initial
transaction as his own; his conduct is only evidence of such
determination. Thus, his affirmance may be shown by the
fact that after knowing of the transaction he did nothing,
if the circumstances are such that he could reasonably have
been expected to dissent unless he were willing to be a party
to the transaction (see § 94).
His election must, however, be definitive. Statements of
consent made to the third person or to the agent usually in-
dicate his final determination. Such statements made to per-
sons not parties to the transaction and not to be acted upon
by them do not usually indicate this, and hence, ordinarily,
such statements are not sufficient evidence of a definitive
election. Whether or not the conduct of the purported prin-
cipal is sufficient to indicate such election is a question of
fact.
b. If, although the principal has affirmed the transaction,
the third person, upon learning that the agent was unau-
thorized and in ignorance of the affirmance, changes his po-
sition so that it would be inequitable to hold him, he may
avoid the effects of the affirmance; the principal, however,
is bound at the election of the third person (see § 89).
Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.
Section 96. EFFECT OF APFInMING PART OF A TRANSACTION.
A contract or other single transaction must be affirmed in
its entirety in order to effect its ratification.
Comment:
a. Thepurported principal must take the transaction in
its entirety, with the burdens as well as the benefits. He can-
not affirm a sale and disavow unauthorized representations
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or warranties which the purported agent made to induce it.
He cannot affirm a contract and-disavow unauthorized terms
which the purported agent has included therein. If the prin-
cipal says he is willing to accept the benefits resulting from
a transaction but is unwilling to be subjected to its obliga-
tions, it is a question of fact whether or not he affirms. If
he manifests that he intends to affirm the transaction and
take the benefits, but does not intend to be subjected to the
liabilities, he affirms the whole transaction and is subject
to any liabilities it creates against him. If he manifests
that he does not intend to affirm the transaction or to re-
ceive the benefits unless he can do so without assuming
the obligation, he does not thereby ratify the transaction
or any portion of it; except that if he brings or main-
tains an action upon, or receives or retains benefits of, an
unauthorized transaction with knowledge of the facts, such
conduct constitutes an affirmance of the entire transaction
irrespective of a manifestation of intent not to be bound by
the liability it imposes, if the other party elects to treat
it as such (see §§ 97-99).
b. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the
purported agent has entered into a single transaction; it has
no application where he has conducted several independent
transactions at approximately the same time or during the
same general course of conduct.
c. Where a person affirms acts done on his account by
one intending to act as his servant, he may affirm the entire
conduct of the purported servant or only portions of it; he
may not, however, affirm a part of a transaction without
affirming that which is incidental to it.
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Annotation:
A principal who adopts the act of one purporting to act for him must adopt
it in toto, and he will not be allowed to claim the benefits arising therefrom and
at the same time reject the burdens thereof. Public Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Green-
wald, 68 Ind. App. 609, 118 N. -E. 556 (1918); Indiana Union Traction Co. v.
Scribner, 47 Ind. App. 621, 93 N. E. 1014 (1911); Adams Exp. Co. v..Carnahan,
29 Ind. App. 606, 63 N. E. 245, 94 Am. St. Rep. 279 (1912).
The use as a defense of a release, procured by the fraud of the agent, by
principal who knew of the fraud has been held to constitute a ratification of the
fraud of the agent. Bailey v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 72 Ind. App.
84, 121 N. E. 128 (1918); Carter v. Richart, 65 Ind. App. 255, 114 N. E. 110
(19i6).
Bringing suit on a contract after knowledge of facts is a ratification of the
contract and binds the principal to special conditions made by agent. Johnson
v. Hoover, 72 Ind. 395 (1880).
A principal claiming the benefit of a contract waiving priority of lien, has
been held bound by the unauthorized promises given in consideration by the
agent. Wayne International Building & Loan Ass'n v. Moats, 149 Ind. 123, 48
N. E. 793 (1897).
A principal with knowledge of improper acts of agent in securing a com-
promise of a claim against the State, has been held not able to claim benefits
of compromise and escape liabilty to agent because of illegality of agent's acts.
Judah v. Trustees of Vincennes University, 16 Ind. 56 (1861).
Where one without authority has purported to act as agent for another per-
son in two separate transactions, ratification of one does not prevent repudiation
of the other. Benson v. Liggett, 78 Ind. 452 (1881).
Where one who received information concerning a contract from the other
party ratified the contract thus communicated and accepted the benefits of it,
this was held not to be a ratification of the terms of the contract as to which
he had no knowledge. Willison v. McKain, 12 Ind. App. 78, 39 N. E. 886 (1894).
Section 97. BRINGING SUIT OR BASING DEFENSE AS AFFIRMANCE.
There is affirmance if the purported principal, with knowl-
edge of the facts, in an action in which the third person or the
purported agent is an adverse party:
(a) brings suit to enforce promises which were part of the
unauthorized transaction or to secure interests which
were the fruit of such transaction and to which he
would be entitled only if the act had been authorized;
(b) bases a defense upon the unauthorized transaction as
- though it were authorized; or
(c) continues to maintain such suit or base such defense.
Comment:
a. The suit may be against the third person for the pur-
chase price of goods sold to him, or against the purported
agent for money or other things received by him for the
principal. The bringing of the suit or the basing of a de-
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fense in such cases is a manifestation of an election by the
principal which, having been made, cannot be retracted.
b. If the purported principal brings or maintains an ac-
tion, or sets up or maintains a defense without knowledge of
the material facts, he may elect to avoid the effect of a
ratification, as in other cases where there is a manifestation
of affirmance (see § 91). If he brings suit or sets up a de-
fense without knowledge of the facts, there is ratification
only if, after learning the facts, he continues to maintain
the suit or defense. If, in the belief that the agent acted
properly, he brings or maintains suit or sets up or maintains
a defense based upon the transaction as the agent was au-
thorized to conduct it, he does not ratify the unauthorized
transaction although he knows that the third person claims
that the transaction included, as it did, unauthorized terms.
c. If the purported principal, with knowledge of the facts,
brings an action or sets up a defense against a person not
a party to the original transaction, basing his claim or de-
fense upon the original transaction, ordinarily he thereby
manifests his affirmance of it. Such conduct, however, does
not necessarily have conclusive effect as does a suit or de-
fense against the agent or the person with whom the agent
dealt.
Annotation:
(a) A suit for the consideration named in a contract is affirmance of the
contract, and, the contract being thereby ratified, the true consideration promised
by the agent to the third person can be shown. Moore v. Butler Uldversity, 83
Ind. 376 ('182).
Where a principal sues to recover money collected by the agent without au-
thority, he thereby ratifies the collection. Knowlton v. School City of Logansport,
75 Ind. 103 (1881).
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A suit for and recovery from the guardian and his bondsmen of the proceeds
of a sale by the guardian is a ratification by the ward. Bevis v. Heflin, 63 Ind.
i29 (1878).
A suit by the owner of a note brought against one who bad collected without
authority is a ratification, and a demand for the sum collected is necessary be-
fore the liability of the agent to account is fixed. Kyser v. Wells, 60 Ind. 261
(1877).
(b) Reliance by defendant on release procured by his agent by means of
unauthorized fraudulent representations is a ratification of the fraud. Bailey v.
London Guarantee & Accident Co.. 72 Ind. App. 84, 121 N. E. 128 (1918);
Carter v. Richart, 65 Ind. App. 255, 114 N. E. 110 (1917).
(c) No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of
this division of section 97.
Section 98. RECEIPT oF BENEFITS AS AYFFMANCE.
The receipt by a purported principal, with knowledge of the
facts, of something to which he would not be entitled unless an
act purported to be done for him were affirmed, and to which
he makes no claim except through such act, constitutes an
affirmance unless at the time of such receipt he repudiates the
act. If he repudiates the act, his receipt of benefits constitutes
an affirmance at the election of the other party to the trans-
action.
Comment:
a. Ordinarily, the receipt by a purported principal who
knows the facts, of things to which he would not be en-
titled unless the transaction were ratified and to which he
makes no claim independently of the act of the purported
agent, indicates his consent to 'become a party to the trans-
action as it was made. Even where he disclaims responsi-
bility for the act of the purported agent, however, he be-
comes subject to liability to the third person from whom the
things were obtained to the same extent as if he had con-
sented to become a party to the transaction, if he receives
its proceeds With knowledge of the facts. Thus, if an agent
inserts in a contract a cause not binding on the principal
and thereby obtains something from the other contracting
party, the receipt of such thing by the principal with knowl-
edge of the unauthorized clause in the contract subjects him
to liability upon the contract as made. Likewise, if an agent
or purported agent obtains goods or money by a fraud for
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which the principal was not liable, the receipt of the pro-
ceeds of the fraud by the principal with knowledge of the
facts subjects him to liability for the fraud.
b. Receipt of benefits without knowledge. The receipt
of benefits by the purported principal without knowledge of
the transaction between the purported agent and the third
person or without knowledge of other material facts does
not constitute affirmance unless the principal assumes the
risk of his lack of knowledge (see § 91). The rule applica-
ble where the purported principal later acquires knowledge
and fails to return the things or their value is stated in § 99.
c. Where principal claims independently. If the pur-
ported principal is otherwise entitled to possession of the
things, received as the result of the agent's act, his receipt
of them does not constitute affirmance, although in connec-
tion with other facts it may be evidence of it. Likewise,
where the principal believes himself to be entitled to the
things independently of the act of the purported agent, the
fact that he knows of the material facts connected with the
transaction as conducted by the agent does not necessarily
cause his receipt of the things to constitute an affirmance.
Thus, if he is mistaken as to his right to possession of the
thing, whether the mistake is of law or of fact, the accept-
ance of the thing accompanied by a repudiation of the
agent's act does not result in an affirmance, if his claim to
possession is based upon grounds other than a transaction
originated by the agent, and the transaction conducted by
the agent is not a compromise of a disputed claim concerning
the subject matter. Thus, if the principal, knowing of its
purported purchase for him by an agent, receives an auto-
mobile under the mistaken belief that it is one previously
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stolen from him, such receipt is not an affirmance of the con-
tract as made by the agent. On the other hand, a mistake
of law as to the effect of his receipt of the thing where he
claims no right to it independently of the agent's act, or a
mistake as to his right to retain, without acceptance of the
compromise, something given by way of compromise, does
not prevent its receipt from being an affirmance of the com-
promise or other transaction.
d. Information without belief. If the principal receives
the proceeds of a transaction, being mistaken as to its terms,
he does not ratify it as made although he has been correctly
told by the third person or by others of its true terms; the
fact that such information has been given him is, however,
evidence that he knows the facts. Thus, if he authorizes an
agent to sell shares without the accrued dividends and the
agent sells them including the dividends, the principal does
not ratify the transaction by receiving the proceeds of the
sale if he believes the agent to have acted in accordance with
his authority, although told by the purchaser of the terms
upon which the sale was made.
e. Election of third person. If the purported principal, al-
though receiving the benefits, repudiates the act which was
done on his behalf, the other party to the transaction has
an election to rescind the transaction or to treat the trans-
action as ratified. Thus, if the purported agent obtains goods
from the third person which are delivered to the principal
who repudiates the agent's act, the third person is entitled
to bring an action for conversion of the goods, or other ac-
tions which would be appropriate if there were no ratifica-
tion.
f. Other requisites of ratification. Although there is an
affirmance by a purported principal if he knowingly receives
the proceeds of an act performed on his account, there is no
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
ratification unless the requisites for ratification stated in
§§ 84-91 are present. Thus, where the original transaction
was not purported to be done on account of the principal,
the fact that the principal receives its proceeds does not
make him a party to it.
Annotation:
The following cases hold that where an unauthorized agent has purported to
act for a principal and the principal, with knowledge of the transaction, accepted
the benefits thereof, there is an affirmance: Kostoff v. Meyer-Kiser Bank, 201
Ind. 396, 168 N. E. 527, 69 L. R. A. 796 (1929); Albany Land Co. v. Rickel,
162 Ind. 222, 70 N. E. 158 (1904); Hawkins v. Fourth Nat. Bank of New York,
1S0 Ind. 117, 49 N. E. 997 (1898); The Bloomfield R. Co. v. Grace, 112 Id.
128, 13 N. E. 680 (1887); Wallace v. Lawyer, 90 Ind. 499 (1882); Pouch v.
Wilson, 59 Ind. 93 (1877); Hauss v. Niblack, 80 Ind. 407 (1881); Moore v.
Pendleton, 16 Ind. 481 (1861); McCarty v. Pruett, 4 Ind. 226 (1853); Palmer
v. Egbert, 4 Ind. 65 (1853); Ross v. City of Madison, 1 Ind. 281, 48 Am. Dec.
361 (1849); Pubtic Savings Ins. Co. of America v. Greenwald, 68 Ind. App.
609, 118 N. E. 556, rehearing denied, 121 N. E. 47 (1918); Carter v. Richart,
65 Ind. App. 255, 114 N. E. 110 (1917); National Life Ins. Co. v. Headrick, 63
Ind. App. 54, 112 N. E. 559 (1916); Washburn-Crosby Milling Co. v. Brown, 56
Ind. App. 104, 104 N. E. 997 (1914); Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Scribner,
47 Ind. App. 621, 93 N. E. 1614 (1911); C. Aultman & Co. v. Richardson, 21
Ind. App. 211, 52 N. E. 86 (1898); Hunt v. Listenberger, 14 Ind. App. 320, 42
N. E. 240 (1896).
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the effect of repudiation of
unauthorized act at the time the benefits were received.
Section 99. RETENTION OF BENEFITS AS AFFIRMANCE.
The retention by a purported principal, with knowledge of
the facts and before he has changed his position, of something
which he is not entitled to retain unless an act purported to
be done on his account is affirmed, and to which he makes no
claim except through such act, constitutes an affirmance unless
at the time of such retention he repudiates the act. Even if he
repudiates the act, his retention constitutes an affirmance at
the election of the other party to the transaction.
Comment:
a. The retention by the principal under the conditions
stated in this Section operates in the same manner as does
the receipt of benefits, and the Comment on § 98 is applica-
ble. Ordinarily, when the principal has received benefits
which he is entitled to retain only if the transaction by
which they were obtained is ratified, and to which he makes
no independent claim, his retention indicates his consent to
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become a party to the transaction; if he disclaims, the per-
son from whom they were obtained may enforce the trans-
action against him, or may elect to treat the retention, as
wrongful and maintain an action therefor. The effect of
making a mistaken claim to retain the goods is the same as
the effect of receiving them under a mistaken claim (see
Comment c on § 98).
b. Destruction, use, or refusal to return. Except as
stated in Comment c on this Section, there is a wrongful
retention if, without, mistake of fact, the principal uses the
things, destroys them, .refuses on demand to return them to
the person entitled to them, or if, knowing such person is ig-
norant of the lack of authority of the agent, he retains them
for an unreasonable length of time without offering to sur-
render them if the other will surrender things of the prin-
cipal given in exchange.
c. Change of principal's situation. The principal is under
no duty to return things received as the result of an unau-
thorized act if, before becoming aware of the facts, he re-
ceives title thereto as a bona fide purchaser, or he incorpo-
rates them in something from which they cannot be sepa-
rated, or if they have become so mixed with his things that
they are indistinguishable. Likewise, if the situation of the
principal has so changed that it is inequitable to require
their return under the changed conditions, their retention
does not constitute an affirmance. In determining whether
it is inequitable to require their return, the fact that the
third person knew that the agent was unauthorized or in
the exercise of care should have known of. it, the amount
of time which has elapsed between the original transaction
and the time when the principal discovered the facts, the
amount of loss which the principal would suffer if he were
required to return the things, and other similar factors are
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considered. If it is found that there has been no affirmance
and the things cannot be returned in specie, the purported
principal may be subject to quasi-contractual liability to
the person from whom the things were obtained. A statement
of such liability is not within the scope of the Restatement
of this Subject.
Annotation:
Receiving and using property after knowledge of unauthorized contract of
purchase is an affirmance of the contract. Wilsoin & Co. v. Mississippi Box
Co., 76 Ind App. 103, 130 N. E. 127 (1921).
Retention of consideration after knowledge of an mnauthorized assignment of
an insurance policy is a ratification of the assignment. Hale v. Hale, 74 Ind.
App. 405, 126 N. E. 692 (1920).
Acceptance and retention of money or property received by virtue of an
unauthorized compromise of claims is a ratification of the settlement. Public
Savings Ins. Co. v. Greenwald, 68 Ind. App. 609, 121 N. E. 47 (1918).
Retention of consideration for assignment of judgment after knowledge of
facts is ratification of assignment. Wallace v. Lawyer, 90 Ind. 499 (1884).
A seller, who retains title with the right to take possession in case of de-
fault, and who receives possession through an agent who took the property from
the buyer under an unauthorized agreement to accept it in satisfaction of the
debt, and holds the property without knowledge of the contract, does not ratify
the agent's act. Reeves & Co. v. Miller, 48 Ind. App. 339, 95 N. E. 677 (1911).
No Indiana cases have been found wherein the effect of repudiation of an
unauthorized act of an agent accompanied retention of the benefits.
